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PREFACE

This report is a product of the New England Regional Commission's Energy
Research and Policy Formulation Program.
The Energy Program will have several
major outputs including:
-Supply/demand data and projections for New England's energy requirements
to 1990.
-Effects on New England from petroleum related industrial development
(including OCS development).
-New England gas industry development study.
-A review of electric power demand and supply trends and forecasts.
-Impacts of recent energy shortages and price increases on New England.
-Guidelines and a handbook for power plant siting.
-Legal and Institutional project, including a compendium and analysis
of energy facility related statutes, and an energy policy and decision
making study.
..
-The New England Fishing Industry and the projected impacts of Outer
Continental Shelf development.
-Analysis and Regulatory Implications of the New England Power Pool.
A complete list of Energy Program publications is available from the Commission's
Energy Program Director.
The goal of the Energy Program is to supply the members of the New England Regional
Commission, which is comprised of the six New England Governors and a Federal
Cochairman appointed by the President, with reliable baseline information on New
England's energy requirements and vulnerability, and to provide the Governors and
the region with viable energy policy options and recommendations to guide New
England's energy future. The Commission's Energy Program staff works closely with
the Energy Advisors to the Governors and Energy Offices of the six New England
states in formulating, analyzing and disseminating the output and results of the
Energy Program, thereby achieving a measure of regional coordination in tackling
the complex of energy problems facing the region.
The Energy Program is also involved in a broad range of projects including
examination and response to national energy policy, outer continental shelf policy
formulation, regional petroleum and natural gas industry development programs , the
Hew England Energy Management Information System, regional power management program,
U.S.-Canadian cooperation on energy matters, and technical policy assistance to the
staffs of the New England Governors on other numerous matters of regional energy
policy formulation and analysis.
We sincerely hope that this report will be of use and will provide some
to the management of New England's energy problems .y

State Cochairman

contribution

INTRODUCTION

In early 1974, the Energy Program of the New England Regional Commission
developed the Energy Research and Policy Formulation Work Program. That
document detailed the scope and thrust of the research which was required
in support of state and regional efforts to understand and deal with New
England's energy situation. Once the work program was approved by the
Commission, a series of interrelated projects were initiated by the staff of
the Energy Program, and contractor support was acquired to carry out several
major studies concerning New England's energy problems. This report, which is
a product of the insights of both the work of consultants who prepared this report,
and the refinements of state energy officials and other professional and academic
individuals and institutions who have reviewed the original documents upon
which this report is based, summarizes the findings of these various research
projects, and contains a strategy for dealing with the complex of energy issues
facing New England.
The material in this volume is occasionally technical in nature, and, because
care has been taken to present the logic of the strategy, and because New England's
energy problems are indeed complicated, the report is demanding of the reader.
The interested reader will also find that the final reports from the afore
mentioned research projects contain a wealth of technical information which is
relevant to the suggestions made in this report.
The report first defines, in summary fashion, New England's energy problem.
Goals and objectives for a region-wide energy program strategy are then
suggested. Finally, mechanisms for implementing this strategy are outlined.
The strategy covers five primary areas: energy conservation; securing supplies
of fossil fuels; management of electric power; energy industry development; and
institutional requirements. The purpose is to initiate a process of strategy for
mulation by indentifying salient issues and opportunities and not to present
a complete analysis of all of New England's energy alternatives, or of all of the
consequences of any single alternative.

* * * * * * *

This report was prepared by Development Sciences Inc. under the supervision and
direction of, and under contract with the New England Regional Commission pursuant
to the Commission's Energy Research and Policy Formulation Program. The state
ments, findings, and recommendations contained in the report are solely those
of Development Sciences Inc., and do not necessarily reflect the views of the New
England Regional Commission.
The New England Regional Commission was created under Title V of the Public
Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, as amended. The Commission is a Fed
eral/State Partnership whose membership is comprised of the Governors of the six
New England States and a Federal Cochairman appointed by the President.
This report is the result of tax-supported research and as such is not copy
rightable. It may be freely reprinted with the customary crediting of source.
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OVERVIEW

Now that time has passed since the oil embargo and its immediate
aftermath, there has been an opportunity to reflect on the issues
which it brought to our attention.

We no longer speak of an energy

crisis, but of solving our energy problems.

It is therefore time to

take stock and assess the implications of our energy situation in its
many dimensions.

Like the rest of the nation, and the world, New

Englanders will have to prepare to deal with a future in which the oil
on which we are almost totally dependent will be in ever shorter supply
at increasingly higher prices.

While the goal of moving away from oil

is clear, the questions of timing, alternatives, prices, and reliability
of supply are replete with difficulties.

If we move too quickly, we

forego the advantages of efficient utilization of the remaining 'easy'
fuels and will be at a comparative disadvantage with the rest of the
nation.

If we move too slowly, we will have to respond to major shifts

later with great social sacrifice.

If we choose the wrong alternatives,

we will be saddled with capital equipment which will have to be paid
for again and again over the years.

Dealing with this situation strains

existing assumptions about traditional relations between private and
public sectors.

Thus, the foundation for a New England energy future

is developed in this document with a sensitivity to the risks of costly
error and the knowledge that we cannot simply mark time in our present
position.
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Building a foundation to deal with the uncertainties of the future,
and with the perceptions of the present, means that we will have to work in
depth and in breadth with the factors which shape our choices.

These

factors do not lend themselves to easy summary or facile statements about
what should be done.

Rather they require a systematic and well coordinated

series of policies and actions which will allow us to cover the breadth
of the challenge.

The document, therefore, begins with a statement of goals and

objectives for programs which are designed to decrease the risk of the
region's energy supply and price as well as to stimulate and protect the
region's economy...and goals which recognize that neither public nor
private sector can act alone in resolving the difficult choices.
The goals and objectives provide only general direction; more mean
ingful statements are found in the deliniation of strategies to accomplish
the stated purposes.

These strategies are diverse and cover a number of

likely situations in which energy, economics, and the long term industrial
base of the region need to be integrated.

These strategies orient toward:

(1) extending the life of scarce fuels; (2) reducing dependence on oil;
(3) increasing the use of renewable resources; (4) relating New England
closer to the supply and price decisions taken outside of New England;
(5) minimizing the price of energy; and (6) accelerating the development
of a New England energy industry.
The more specific design of the strategies is based on the consider
able research done by NERCOM over the last two years and draws heavily on the
facts generated and the debates carried on during that period.

Therefore,

the document contains elements of program strategies for conservation of
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energy, for securing supplies of fossil fuels from different sources, for
managing electric power, and for developing a New England energy industry.
With the passage of time and the accumulation of research results obtained
since the crisis, we have learned that the regional problem is not readily
summarized in one aggregated statement.

We have also learned that the

answer, therefore, cannot be stated in one succinct statement covering the
many dimensions of the issues involved.

Therefore, we must move through

the diverse structure of the problems posed by energy issues while being
comprehensive and thorough, systematic and consistent, yet able to deal
with the unique and transient forms which world, national, and regional
forces will impose on us.
Conservation is one of the keystones of policy in dealing with the
systemic energy needs, for only through demand management and the develop
ment of supplemental sources can a reasonably smooth transition to a new
energy base be accomplished.

Improvements in the efficiency of energy use,

and replacement of some of our scarce fuels by renewable resources, can help
insure against discontinuities in our energy supplies.

During the transition

we will still rely on fossil fuels, and that means directions for the ex
ploiting of Georges Bank for both fish and oil; an active program for locating
petroleum facilities; a recognition of the importance of natural gas, both
if 1t runs out early or if it is found near New England; an appreciation
of the role coal can play in present or future forms; and an international
trade program to stabilize our foreign sources of supply.

Along with

conservation and a measured approach to fossil fuels, the management of
electric power becomes imperative.

Capacity planning, load management,

supplemental fuels, fuel conversion, and nuclear power are all on the
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agenda of the management of electric power.

Nor can strategies overlook

the economic development potential of the energy industry for New England
Incentives need to be provided to develop a diverse energy industry; in
vestments will have to be secured; and research in support of program
objectives will have to be undertaken.

In sum, the strategies need to

be sweeping in scope and sensitive in depth to the ever changing market
conditions and the ability of consumers to adapt to the changes thrust
upon them.
To accomplish these strategies, implementation mechanisms will have
to be developed.

The world, the nation, and New England are each moving

from one energy management system to another.

Sometimes the moves have

been sudden and sometimes barely visible to the naked eye.

We are moving

nonetheless and it is imperative that we are conscious of our direction
and, as much as possible, master of our fate.

This cannot be achieved

without innovative and dynamic leadership from both the public and private
sectors.
No satisfactory foundation for a New England energy future can be
constructed and implemented without the hard work of highly aware and
deeply committed institutions.

Mechanisms are developed to give New England

leadership the means to operate in the difficult environment where con
sensus is absent and choices are filled with large consequences.

For

move we must and, like it or not, we are already driven to change.
Building the New England energy future need not be fearsome nor done in
an air of pessimism.

In fact, there are always opportunities in change

and the programs and strategies presented are designed to create and take
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advantage of the opportunities as well as to protect and preserve New
England's future.
When that future is contemplated, the policy which will bring us
to the desired end is summarized in three main thrusts.
conservation.

The first is

Conservation is essential to minimize the need for us to

make an untimely choice from among the undesirable alternatives of present
day oil, coal, or nuclear power technologies.

Conservation is critical to

buy time for us to develop alternatives more suited to New England's long
term needs.

It is also critical that we reduce our wasteful depletion of

precious resources.
Buying time is, however, not sufficient for we must live with what
is here now or on the horizon.

For that reason the second thrust is

toward more effective utilization of remaining fossil energy.

Much of the

program development is dedicated to making the sources of fossil energy
more secure, and to trying to keep the price of energy from retarding the
New England economy.

A phased and balanced program of development of

Georges Bank potential and of dealing with imports follows on the heels
of a conservation program.
Neither conservation nor substitution for oil by coal and nuclear
power provide a sufficient answer in the long run.

Ultimate acceptable

solutions will draw on many fuels and sources of energy.

It should be

the third keystone of New England policy that the economic development
opportunities to be found in these varied solutions should be secured
for New England.

The goals of economic development and secure energy

sources can reinforce one another.

Linking economic development with

has been elevated to a major public issue.

And because energy is essential

to the maintenance of the quality of life and to the continuance of
economic functions, there is no responsible way to avoid dealing with
energy security issues head-on and effectively.

THE ENERGY PROBLEM IN NEW ENGLAND
In New England, the problems triggered by the embargo fall into two
areas of serious concern to public officials and their constituents.
first is security of energy supply.

The

The second is security of the regional

economy in the face of yet another growth-mitigating force.

The problems

are complicated, but certain conditions which cause them to be both real
and potentially devastating to the region deserve both recognition and
effort to change:
CONDITION ONE: MANAGEMENT OF ENERGY SUPPLY AND PRICE - New England
is in the unfortunate position of being physically distant from the
sources of its needed fossil fuels (e.g., residual oil from Venezuela,
natural gas from the Southwest) as well as organizationally distant
from decisions regarding the development, distribution, and pricing
of these fuels. From a management point of view, this is risky—
especially when the commodity involved is essential, is primarily
controlled by a very few number of organizations, and is known to be
in short supply. For example, New England's demands for oil are not
sufficient enough for the region to have clout with OPEC. New
England's ties with the major domestic oil companies are also loose
and tenuous; the region has been an outlet for excess product of
domestic refineries, and is not (yet) a major factor in the invest
ment decisions of the major members of the oil (or energy) industry.
The only developed line of communication between New England and
major fossil fuel supply and price decisions is to Washington, and
this link is subject to the vicissitudes of national and regional
politics. Furthermore, the physical distance from sources of fossil
fuels means that the region pays a price premium for the transportation
of oil, gas, and coal to New England users. Thus, with limited re
serves of fossil fuels, little or no regional fossil fuel extraction
and processing industry, varying degrees of influence over Washingtonbased energy decisions, and fuel demands which are not large enough to
influence price or supply through traditional market mechanisms, New
England lacks influence over its suppliers of fossil fuels, and is
forced to pay the price penalties associated with dealing with distant
fuel sources. This means that the region is currently fully exposed
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to the risks of supply interruptions and price increases or dis
parities and is only minimally able to manage these risks. Adding
to this condition of limited influence is the fact that well over
eighty percent of the region's energy requirements are met by oil
products"; over ninety percent of the requirements are satisfied by
oil and natural gas together. It is estimated that the worldwide
reserves of these fossil fuels could supply estimated demands for 25
to 40 years, Thus, New England is not only vulnerable because of
distance from its sources of fossil fuels and from energy supply and
price decisions, it is also exposed to the risk that the fuels which
it uses to heat buildings and run machinery will simply not be avail
able in the near future— from any source. Domestic additions to
natural gas reserves, for example, have been declining for the last
10 years. A continuation in this decline could mean that by 1990
only a little more than one-half of New England's requirements will
be able to be met from domestic supplies of natural gas.
CONDITION TWO: DOUBTS OVER NUCLEAR POWER - Currently, the only
proven large-scale energy production technology which provides New
England with an alternative to its almost complete reliance of petroleumbased fossil fuels is electricity generation from nuclear power plants.
Ironically, however, the proliferation of nuclear power is constrained
by a series of problems. (In the case of the debate over nuclear
power, most of these problems have a dual constituency— one arguing
that the problem is real, the other that it is not.) The problems
include the possible scarcity of domestic uranium, reliability and
cost of the nuclear power plant, safety of the plant, security of the
plant and the nuclear fuel distribution system, and adequacy of nuclear
waste disposal methods. These technical problems, however debatable,
stand in the way of new plant construction, and are receiving substan
tial attention by federal agencies, electric utilities, state agencies,
system vendors, public interest groups, and private and public research
organizations. In New England, these technical problems are compli
cated by declining public confidence in electric utilities and their
regulators. Furthermore, there is evidence that the region's utilities
have excess generating capacity, and that much less expansion than
was formerly planned is required in order to meet future demands for
electricity. This could result in an inability to justify a signifi
cant increase in the number of nuclear plants over the next fifteen
years, thus limiting the rate at which nuclear power plants can replace
fossil fuel-based plants. Finally, decreased availability of capital
to New England utilities may severely limit the ability of electric
utilities to finance whatever expansion they can justify.
CONDITION THREE: ECONOMIC DECLINE - The rapid emergence of the South,
Southwest, and West as high growth economies reflects a movement of
new investment away from the "older" regions of the country and toward
those which are richer in resources, closer to growing national markets,
relatively near sources of reasonably priced energy, and which enjoy a
mild climate. The many locational disadvantages of New'Ehgland cause
the regional economy to be vulnerable to forces which increase these
disadvantages to the point where local industry is no longer able to
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compete in the national market place. Thus, New England's
economy is fragile relative to those regions that enjoy the
comparative advantages sought by business. This fragility
is most apparent when national recessionary, or inflationary,
conditions are clearly amplified throughout the region (such
as during the 1974-1975 period) and when economic recovery
(e.g., reduction in the unemployment rate) lags far behind
other parts of the country. This economic environment inter
acts with the energy problem in three ways. First, the con
sequences of increased energy prices are severe (e.g., to
unemployed persons and to already financially distressed or
marginal businesses) and, therefore, require more public
attention. Second, capital may not be attracted for invest
ments in facilities that might alleviate some of the energy
problem. Third, the image of economic decline, high energy
prices, vulnerability to energy shortages, and apparent
hostility toward industrial development may cause some indus
tries and investors to look away from New England for their
next investments.
New England's limited control over its energy future is hardly a
new phenomenon— the region has been exposed to the risk of aberrations
in energy supply and price for many years.

Before the risk became an

event (the embargo) rather than a possibility, neither the threat of a
serious problem nor the information concerning its likelihood and its
impact on New England was sufficient enough to cause (or, perhaps,
require) action-taking at the public level.

Now, however, the problem

is understood as more than vulnerability to foreign oil producers.

New

England is currently and almost totally at the "end of the line," and
it is consuming fuels that are dangerously close to the end of their
lifetimes and is paying a dear price to do so.
warranted.

But what should be done?

Now action-taking is

And what can be done?

GOALS FOR NEW ENGLAND
Because of New England's precarious position vis-a-vis energy, none
of the answers to the questions of "what should" and "what can" be done can
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be expected to "solve" the region's energy problems.

Indeed, many of

the alternatives available to New England are themselves risky and fraught
with caveats.

Some of the alternatives are even difficult to justify

without more information than is currently available.

Thus, the region's

energy problems not only require immediate and decisive attention by our
policy-makers— they require also awillingness

and preparedness to adjust

a chosen course in response to newinformation

and new options.

This

means that New England's need is twofold— for a policy (direction) on the
one hand, and for an energy management capability on the other.

Both

must be flexible without sacrificing definitive action-taking and progress
toward a realizable set of goals.
Energy goals for New England should provide a framework for developing
and implementing both a time-phased program of energy-related actions and
a legal and institutional structure which facilitates the timely implemen
tation of these actions.

The goals for the region should also allow, or

even stimulate, a diversity in the programs of

the individual states.

Properly

coordinated, this diversity can strengthen both the region's energy program
and the individual state programs.

Finally, the goals should help to focus

effort on the most crucial of the region's current and possible future
energy-related problems.
Although New England's energy goals

must be defined by those who

shoulder the burden of determining and implementing the region's energy
policy, the energy problem is well enough understood to outline the
essential elements so that a context for change is established.

The two

fold challenge to establish directions for action-taking, and to create a
capability to manage, translates into a requirement for: (1) goals which
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guide action-program formulation (programmatic goals); and (2) goals which
guide the process of developing a capability to implement desirable programs
(institutional goals).
. Programmatic Goals
- To decrease the region'senergy supply and price risks.
- To stimulate and protect the region's economy.
. Institutional Goals
- To cause public and private organizations to act in a manner
which reinforces programmatic goals, which conscientiously
protects the health and welfare of individuals, and which
preserves the quality of the region's environment.
- To provide information which makes it possible:

(a)

to refine

or re-direct on-going programs; (b) to define, select, and
implement new ones; and (c) to anticipate and deal with energyrelated problems before they occur.
- To seek an appropriate balance bmong private, state, and multi
state energy planning and action-taking.

Alone, these goals have limited utility.

Supported by definite

strategies for their attainment, they become meaningful.

PROGRAM STRATEGY:

OBJECTIVES

There is no single action which will meet the energy challenges of
New England.

The best which can be done is to attack the problem on all

fronts while working toward better solutions in the future.

In line with the

stated goals for New England's energy program, a "good" strategy should:
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. Reduce energy supply and price risks, especially the risks of:
- Partial or complete reduction of supplies of one or more fuels
from one or more sources.
- Severe or total depletion of the reserves of one or more of
the fuels which the region relies heavily upon.
- Drastic and rapid increases in the price of one or more fuel.
- Long-term disparities between the average price paid by New England
for its energy and that paid by its economic competitors (domestic
and foreign) for their energy.
. Contribute to the solution of some of the region's economic problems,
especially those which are exacerbated by:
- Decline or stagnation of existing industries as a result of
declining competitive position due in part to relatively higher
costs for energy for processing, space heating and lighting, and
distribution.
- Threats to the viability of certain existing industries as a result
of uncertainties regarding the availability of fuels for process
energy.
- Gradual out-migration of industry from the region, and limited
replacement of lost jobs by expansions of existing businesses end
by the in-migration or formation of new businesses, due in part
because of the region's energy prices and supply uncertainties.
Thus, a good program strategy would lead toward more energy supply
security for essential and desirable economic functions, would reduce (or
prevent a worsening in) the energy price differential between New England
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and other regions of the country, and would help increase employment in the
region.
A four-point energy program strategy is recommended.

The key elements

of the strategy are:
1. Energy Conservation
2. Securing supplies of fossil fuels
3. Management of electric power generation
4. Development of a New England energy industry
The strategies are directed at a number of end-results, the most
important of which are to:
. Extend the life of scarce fuels.
. Reduce dependence on petroleum-based fuels.
. Increase the utilization of renewable fuel sources.
. Decrease the "distance" between New England and itssources of
fossil fuels and/or the sources of fuel supply or pricedecisions.
. Minimize the price of electricity.
. Improve New England's economic competitive position by minimizing
unnecessary fuel price disparities, and by minimizing the average
cost of energy (i.e., the cost of the fuel mix).
. Accelerate development of a New England energy industry.
PROGRAM ELEMENT ONE: Energy Conservation
This first element of the program strategy consists of two components—
demand management and use of supplemental sources of energy.

Conservation is

so essential to the program strategy that it should be considered the key
stone to the region's energy policy.
Demand Management - The objective for the demand management component is to
increase the efficiency of energy use in New England.

Reductions in energy
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consumption per unit of activity and the reduction of certain activities are
methods which, once employed, will lead toward a dampening of the growth of
regional energy demands.
Supplemental Sources - The immediate objective for the supplemental source
component is to replace some fossil or nuclear fuels with energy derived
from renewable resources (e.g., from solar energy, solid waste, wood, wind,
etc.).

The long-term objective is to have base-load demands satisfied by

renewable or replenishable sources of energy rather than by fossil sources
which have limited lifetimes.

Purposes - The conservation element of the program strategy accomplishes
two important purposes.
fuels on the one hand

Conservation extends the life of scarce fossil
and (through the supplemental source component of the

strategy) allows for their "best" use, e.g., oil and natural gas for mobile
sources, process energy, chemical feedstocks, and space heating in large
densely populated urban areas.

In extending the life of scarce fossil

fuels, conservation buys valuable time for research and development on
methods for utilizing various forms of solar energy (e.g. photovoltaic
cells for conversion of solar energy to electricity, heat engines for
conversion of ocean thermogradients to electricity, production of a storable
and transportable fuel (hydrogen) from solar-generated electricity, windmills
for electricity generation, and so on).
Development of supplemental energy sources also leads toward new jobs
for New Englanders in equipment fabrication, construction, and facility
operation.

Many of these jobs would otherwise be added to the economies of

those who supply New England with its fossil fuels.
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PROGRAM ELEMENT TWO:

Securing Supplies of Fossil Fuels

The second element of the program strategy contains five components—
development of potential Georges Bank offshore oil and gas reserves, de
velopment of regional petroleum refining and processing facilities, main
tenance of natural gas supplies, development of indigenous coal reserves
and/or acquisition of coal from other sources, and establishment of trade
agreements for nondomestic energy resources.

Georges Bank - The objective for the Georges Bank development component of
the strategy is twofold.

First, the strategy is to assure that if the Bank

contains economically developable quantities of oil and/or gas, and if the
policy of the federal government continues to favor accelerated development
rather than strategic use (or nonuse) of our remaining oil reserves,
the oil and gas will be brought into New England for processing and distri
bution.

The second objective is to find and implement methods for developing

the Bank which do not compromise the short- or long-term health of the New
England offshore or inshore fishery and fishing industry.
Petroleum Facilities - The objectives for the petroleum facility development
component of the strategy are to encourage environmentally and economically
sound proposals to create a regional capacity to receive and refine crude oil
as well as to distribute product, and to increase the capacity of product
storage facilities to a level sufficient to cover demands during the period
between potential supply interruptions and reallocation of domestic output.
A sub-objective is to begin preparation for processing the possible oil from
development of Georges Bank.
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Natural Gas - The objective for the natural gas component of the strategy
is to provide the gas industry with incentives to increase or maintain the
supply of natural gas to New England-through accelerated exploration for
new developable reserves» through additional importation of liquefied natural
gas» and through increased liquefaction and storage of off-season supplies
of domestic pipeline gas.

A sub-objective is to maintain the viability of

the existing New England gas industry so that the region is prepared for the
possible natural gas finds on Georges Bank.
Coal - The objective for the coal development component of the strategy is
to determine whether or not it is economically, socially, and environmentally
desirable to make it possible for New England electric utilities to acquire
and receive coal instead of residual oil for burning in existing or new
fossil fuel plants.

The coal could come from possible indigenous reserves

(the Narragansett Basin) or from southern deep mines (by barge and/or rail)
or from western surface mines (by rail or slurry pipeline).

Ex-regional

coal could be converted at or near the mine to gas or electricity, which
could be transmitted to New England via pipeline or wire.

If it is

desirable and feasible to substantially increase coal supplies to New
England, the objective will be to encourage electric utilities to switch
from oil to coal, thereby conserving scarce oil or releasing it for better uses.
Trade - The objective for the trade agreement component of the strategy is
to establish a method for acquiring foreign energy resources which is based
upon an exchange of goods and services for energy.

This would provide the

region with a more direct means to establishing a mutually dependent re
lationship with foreign suppliers.
services also would be developed.

An outlet for New England goods and
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Purposes - The supply security element of the program strategy serves five
important purposes.

First, it results in a partial shift in the region's

sources of oil from foreign or distant domestic sources to sources within
or close to the region.

Second, it provides encouragement to industry to

develop new reserves of fossil fuels.

Third, it establishes a closer

two-way relationship between the region and foreign suppliers.

Fourth,

it may result in a fossil fuel mix that is more balanced; e.g. in which
coal replaces considerable amounts of residual oil.

Finally, this element

of the strategy leads to increased regional employment in jobs associated
with the development of a regional energy industry and with the trade
arrangements established with foreign suppliers.
PROGRAM ELEMENT THREE:

Management of Electric Power

The third element of the program strategy consists of five components—
capacity planning, management of rate structures and demand loads, utilization
of supplemental fuels, conversion from oil to coal, and increased use of
nuclear plants.
Capacity Planning - The objective for the capacity planning component of
the strategy is to assure that the mix of generating and transmission
facilities results in the lowest possible cost of electricity and, especially,
that total generating capacity does not exceed the requirements to meet demand
and to provide reasonable reliability factors.

A related objective is to

streamline the process for siting a new facility so as to reduce the lead
time for adding new capacity.
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Load Management - The objective for the load management component is to
define and implement rate structures and other demand management methods
that will result in the leveling of load over the transmission period,
i.e., that will cause a redistribution of load so as to reduce peak loads
while increasing off-peak loads.

Load management has the potential for

reducing needs for new capacity through more efficient utilization of ex
isting capacity.

It may also result in reductions in the cost of electricity

to consumers.
Supplemental Fuel - The objective for the supplemental fuel component of
the strategy is to cause, where feasible, the use of energy resources such
as refuse-derived fuel, wood, and wood waste as supplements to oil or coal
for firing utility boilers.

A second objective is to develop mechanisms

which encourage small-scale on-site generation of electricity from 9uch
sources as windmills, water-powered turbines, and fuel cells in a manner
that is complementary to, and compatible with, generation from large plants.
Conversion - The objective for the coal conversion component of the program
strategy is to achieve, where economically, socially, and environmentally
feasible,

a balance in the power plant fossil fuel mix between residual

oil and coal.
Nuclear Power - The objective for the nuclear power plant component of the
strategy is to determine how to overcome the cost, reliability, safety, and
waste disposal problems of nuclear generating plants.

The ultimate

objective is to optimize the nuclear fraction of new base-load capacity
additions as long as the plants are competitive with fossil fuel or other
alternatives and as long as a long-term supply of nuclear fuel is assured.
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PurPP.ses - Two primary purposes are served by the electric power manage
ment element of the program strategy.

The most important result of the

strategy is that, through sound planning for new capacity, load manage
ment, and use of supplementary fuels, the cost of generating electricity
can be kept at a minimum.

The second result is a partial shift in fuel '

consumption from scarce and expensive oil to more abundant coal and to
renewable or replenishable energy sources.
PROGRAM ELEMENT FOUR: Energy Industry Development
The final element of the program strategy is composed of two components—
investments in new energy industry enterprises and incentives for energy
industry development.

Each component is intended to stimulate development

of an energy industry in New England— through formations of new businesses',
through attraction of expansion facilities of ex-regional companies, and
through expansion of existing New England businesses.

Investment - The objectives for the investment component of the strategy
are to make land available for certain energy industry development and to
make capital available to qualified new enterprises that are engaged in
the development and marketing of promising new energy technologies.

Of

particular interest are those technologies that are based on the use of
renewable energy sources, or that utilize the energy potential of solid or
liquid wastes or waste heat,or that substantially improve the efficiency
of energy conversion or consumption.
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Incentives - The objective for the incentives component of the strategy
is to develop and implement a series of incentive mechanisms that are
sufficient to make New England an attractive location for businesses
engaged in energy R&D, extraction, processing, and distribution.
Purposes - Three purposes are served by this element of the program
strategy.

Development of an energy industry will add substantially to

the job base of the region.

Energy industry development also will pro

vide, because of the image of growth and the economic multipliers associ
ated with the energy production cycle, a stimulus to the regional economy
in general.

Finally, the existence of a flourishing full-scope energy

industry in New England will provide the region with more direct access
to possible solutions to its long-range energy problems.

Summary
As was promised in the Overview, the recommended program strategy is
complex, broadly scoped, and systematically interrelated.

An aggressive

program of energy conservation, through demand management as well as de
velopment of supplemental and renewable sources of energy, is the keystone
to the entire strategy.

Because conservation alone does not "solve" New

England's energy problems, actions in support of securing the region's
necessary supplies of fossil fuels are suggested.

Improved management of

electric power, in turn, is viewed as inextricably linked to both the con
servation strategy and the fossil fuel strategy.

Finally, economic develop

ment through stimulation of energy industry development is proposed as an
opportunity for the region to deal with its economic and energy needs in
a unified program.
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To summarize, the program strategy elements and components, and their
respective objectives, are listed below:
fHE OBJECTIVE OF:

IS TO:

The ENERGY CONSERVATION element

Reduce consumption of non
renewable resources

-the Demand Management component

Reduce energy consumption

-the Supplemental Sources component

Utilize renewable resources

The SECURING SUPPLIES OF
FOSSIL FUELS element

Reduce fossil fuel supply and
price risks

-the Georges Bank component

Co-develop oil and fish resources

-the Petroleum Facilities component

Reduce oil supply risks

-the Natural Gas component

Maintain or increase gas supplies

-the Coal, component

Consider increases in coal
supplies

-the Trade component

Secure foreign oil

The MANAGEMENT OF ELECTRIC POWER
element

Minimize electricity price and
balance fuel mix

-the Capacity Planning component

Optimize generation capacity

-the Load Management component

Reduce demands for new capacity

-the Supplemental Fuel component

Utilize renewable resources

-the Conversion component

Switch from oil to coal

-the Nuclear Power component

Switch from oil to nuclear

The ENERGY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT
element

Stimulate economic growth

-the Investment component

Sponsor new business ventures

-the Incentives component

Stimulate private investment
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The following section explores in greater detail some of the more
important factors that bear upon New England's ability to meet these
objectives» and suggests some mechanisms for initiating a course of action.

PROGRAM STRATEGY:

IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS

A strategic attack on the energy problems of New England is a demanding
task.

There does not exist one dominant and large-scale method, or even a

few, for reducing the region's exposure to energy risks.

Thus, the attack

must be eclectic without sacrificing comprehensiveness.

However, the danger

inherent in a diverse program is that the many elements of the program may
be implemented in such a way that future options are closed off, or that
some actions do not complement others.

Thus, the attack must be systematic

and cognizant of the timing and consequences of results without compromising
flexibility to redirect the program in the future.
Unfortunately, the power and will to launch

and continuesuch a

strategic program in New England may be so diffused among local, state,
regional, and federal public officials, private industry, public interest
groups, and private citizens that incentives to act in the common interest,
and accountability for actions and results, are so obfuscated and diversely
interpreted that leadership is likely to be subordinated to a myriad of
ad hoc confrontations.

Thus, the attack must facilitate effective appli

cations of the authorities and influence of the six New England governors
so that key actors within and outside the region
a manner which reinforces the program strategy.

are stimulated to act in
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These three demands for implementing the program strategy— that
implementation be eclectic, that it be systematic and flexible, and that
the authorities of the governors be applied effectively— form a basis for
disaggregating the program strategy objectives into mechanisms for imple
mentation.

These mechanisms then can serve as a menu for action program

formulation by the several states of New England.

Energy Conservation
Now that the price of energy is high, and the proven reserves of most
fuels are dwindling rapidly, efficient use of energy not only makes sense—
it is essential.
England.

Energy conservation is particularly important to New

It is through conservation, for example, that the region can

most significantly protect against the impacts of higher fuel prices.

For,

by reducing consumption, more family income, business profits, and tax
payers' dollars will be available for investment in the New England economy.
And, because conservation extends the life of scarce fuels, the region "buys"
valuable time for better energy production methods to be perfected and
cmmercialized.

Furthermore, conservation actions seldom have negative en

vironmental consequences.

Thus, conservation is good per se, and good be

cause it is the best way to make it possible to avoid having to make un
timely decisions to implement undesirable or underdeveloped energy pro
duction technologies.

(Of course, if this added time is not used

effectively, this benefit of conservation is wholly or partially foregone.)
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There are three methods for conserving scarce fuels.

One is to

reduce the amount of energy used per energy consuming activity (e.g.,
to decrease the gasoline consumed per vehicle-mile traveled).

Another

is to reduce the amount of energy consuming activity (e.g., to decrease
the number of vehicle-miles traveled).

The third method is to replace

nonrenewable fuels with energy derived from renewable or replenishable
resources (e.g., solar heating systems for buildings).

Whereas the

first two methods can be classified as demand management techniques,
the third method is, in actuality, a form of fuel switching in which the
switch is partial and, thus, to a supplemental fuel which is (or can be)
in infinite supply.

The three methods are interrelated and are not in

conflict with one another if they are carefully implemented.
Demand Management* -

Research on

energy demands indicates

that if in the future the region's energy consuming sectors are no more
efficient in their use of energy than they were in 1974, then by 1990 New
England will require more than 60 percent more energy than it required in
1974.

This increase of almost two quadrillion Btu's (quads) of input

energy is roughly equivalent to over 900,000 barrels of oil per d a y enough to keep four good size refineries running at full capacity.
It is estimated that a comprehensive program of demand management
could reduce New England's projected energy needs by over 20 percent by 1990.
This would mean that the region's incremental energy requirements (over
1974 demands) would be about cut in half.
*

The data in this
Little, Inc. for
See, especially,
of New England's

For certain fuels, especially

section are based, in part, on the work by Arthur D.
the Energy Program of the New England Regional Commission.
ADL's report to NERC0M entitled "Preliminary Projections
Energy Requirements" (September 1975).
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natural gas, distillate oil, and gasoline, incremental requirements can be
reduced by approximately 60 percent to 90 percent.

Table 1 illustrates

some of the fuel savings achievable through increased energy use efficiencies
The first column shows that, on the average, the region's 1990 energy demands
could be over 1.62 times the 1974 demands.

The second column indicates that

demand management could reduce this multiple to 1.29 times 1974 demands.

The

third column shows that this savings is equivalent to over half of the pro
jected incremental demand for the 1974-1990 period.

TABLE 1
SOME 1990 ENERGY SAVINGS THROUGH DEMAND MANAGEMENT

Incremental Requirements
Over 1974 Demands
Base Case Demand Management
GASOLINE

48%

4%

92%

DISTILLATE OIL

39%

8%

80%

NATURAL GAS

30%

13%

56%

RESIDUAL OIL*

73%

46%

37%

104%

70%

31%

ALL FOSSIL FUELS

54%

23%

57%

TOTAL INPUT ENERGY 1
(weighted average)

62%

29%

53%

ELECTRICITY

*

Incremental Energy
Saved Through
Demand Management

I

Residual oil savings are based onprojections in which the 1990 ratio
of nuclear power plant generating capacity to fossil fuel plant
capacity is assumed to be roughly the same as for 1974.
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These savings will occur only if the sectors which consume energy are
motivated to take whatever actions are required to minimize the growth in
regional energy input requirements.

In New England, the prime targets for

imporved efficiency of energy use are the residential, commercial, and
transportation sectors.

It is possible, over the next fifteen years, to

reduce the expected growth in consumption of energy for space heating and
cooling, for lighting and applicances, and for transportation, by between
20 percent and 30 percent.

Specifically, projected 1990 demands for

energy by:
. The RESIDENTIAL sector can be reduced by— 23% (0.2 Quads)
. The COMMERCIAL sector can be reduced by— 21% (0.2 Quads)
. The TRANSPORTATION sector can be reduced by— 28% (0.3 Quads)
Reduced demands by the residential and commercial sectors will, in
turn, lead toward a fuel savings of approximately 18 percent (or 0.3 Quads)
by electric utilities.
The New England industrial sector as a whole has limited ability to
save energy through efficiency measures (NERCOM estimates show potential
average industrial energy savings at less than 5%).

However, certain

industries, such as textile mills, apparel, paper products, and electrical
equipment can achieve up to 20 percent savings in energy for processing
by making certain changes in their production processes.

Furthermore,

industry can cause other forms of energy savings through shared waste
treatment, materials reuse, and utilization of waste heat.
Conservation of energy does more than save scarce fuels.
saves money.

It also

The 20 percent reduction in 1990 energy consumption will,
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for example, reduce New England's annual energy bill by almost $2 billion,
or an average saving of over $350 per household per year.*

In addition,

this level of energy savings results in reduced needs for refining capacity
and for additional power plants.

Thus, scarce capital is freed for other

purposes— including investments in alternative energy production technologies.
For example, the 20 percent reduction in energy consumption means that be
tween now and 1990:

. Tworefineries (at250,000 barrels per day capacity) will not
need to be built.
This will save about...... .............$1.3 billion
. Over 5,900 megawatts of power generatingcapacitywill not
need to be built.
This will save about.............. *.7T?i$6.0 billion
Perhaps the most important consequence of efficient energy use is
that it extends the life of scarce fossil fuels.

If, hypothetically,

New England had its own captive source of oil, a 20 percent reduction in
demand would add a year or so to the life of the oil reserve for every
five years in which the region achieved the savings.

This extension of

reserve life becomes particularly meaningful to New England if the region
achieves a reasonable measure of control over the rate of development,
processing, and distribution of potential Georges Bank oil.
The level of energy use efficiency which is required of New England
will take time to achieve.

It also takes a strong commitment on the

part of the states to see to it that steps are taken to initiate and
sustain an effective set of action programs.

Listed below are some

mechanisms which might comprise the various programs.

*

In 1975 dollars.
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GENERAL
A. Voluntary conservation of energy could occur on a
massive scale if the public feels a need for their
actions and, in turn, perceives that there will be
VOLUNTARY
CONSERVATION

some tangible payoff.

Once public behavior towards

energy consumption, and especially toward investments
in conservation methods, is changed— progress toward
an energy efficient regional economy will be greatly
accelerated.

A comprehensive region-wide campaign to

seek voluntary reduction in the consumption of all
forms of energy by all consuming sectors is warranted.
Precious fuels will be saved for their best uses, and
the consumer will save money.

This campaign could

include: (a) a concentrated effort to develop an
understanding of the costs to the region of not re
ducing energy consumption and of the dollar savings
accrued if consumption is reduced; (b) educational
programs in which people— as students, as private
consumers, as participants in local government, and
as members of industry— learn alternatives to
present energy practices; and (c) technical assistance
from state and regional organizations to local
communities that are interested in implementing con
servation programs.

30

B. Statewide land use controls that are designed to en
courage development patterns that lead to efficient use
LAND
USE

of scarce natural resources could have a profound impact
on future energy consumption in New England.

However,

federal and state agencies have only recently begun to
define land use in the context of energy consumption.
This new information should be understood so that it
can influence the design of future land-use legislation
before it is introduced.
C. The public sector is in a position to provide visible
leadership in energy conservation.
STATE
EXAMPLESETTING

To demonstrate this

leadership, all New England state agencies, and all
public and private organizations which receive funds
from the several states or from the New England Regional
Commission, could be required to develop and implement
energy conservation "positive performance" programs
which are exemplary to the citizens and institutions
of New England.

Once committed to, these programs

should be strictly enforced, especially those elements
related to transportation (e.g., fleet size and mix,
vehicle speed limits), space heating, and use of
electricity (especially for lighting).
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TRANSPORTATION
A. The 55-mile per hour speed limit for motor vehicles
can result in substantial reductions in gasoline
consumption.
SPEED
LIMITS

It also seems to have caused a reduction

in the auto-related fatility rate.

Unfortunately,

motorists are showing signs of pre-embargo (speeding)
behavior.

To assure continued savings in gasoline,

the states can enforce, stringently and with con
sistently severe state-to-state penalties for vio
lation, the current speed limits.

The federal govern

ment should be encouraged to maintain this policy
at the national level.
B. Improving the energy efficiency of motor vehicles
is one of the most important factors in acheiving
any significant reduction in energy requirements
VEHICLE
EFFICIENCY

for transportation.

The states can implement,

through taxation and public information programs,
disincentives for the sale in New England of auto
mobiles and trucks that do not meet reasonably
established standards of operating efficiency.
Federal standards, however, would be most desirable
and should be encouraged.

The efficiency standards

could be increased gradually starting with the 1979
model year; tax penalties could be keyed to the
results of EPA vehicle fuel consumption tests.
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C. From a technological point of view, the simplest,
and potentially the most effective, method for
achieving a more energy-efficient transportation
CAR
POOLING

system is to increase the number of passengers per
commuter vehicle-mile.

The states can develop

aggressive progrmas, through parking fees and regu
lations, variable tolls on roads and other accessways to cities, and reserved highway lanes, to en
courage car pooling in metropolitan areas for
commuter trips to and from place of work.
D. A well-utilized mass transit system is an energy
efficient alternative to the private automobile for
trips within an urban area.

Improvements in the

region's transit systems are gradually occurring as
MASS
TRANSIT

increased federal funding becomes available.

The

states can accelerate this process by supplementing
current and planned federal funding for improvements
in mass transportation systems with funds from state
motor vehicle fuel tax

collections, and by actively

seeking to improve not only opportunities for the
commuting/traveling public to use mass transportation
but also to improve the level of service, quality,
and marketing of existing and planned systems.

These

transit programs can include mechanisms for achieving
better use of existing traditional transit facilities
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(especially buses) as well as facilities such as taxis
and jitneys.
MASS
TRANSIT
(continued)

They can also be designed to creatively

use rolling stock for nonpassenger purposes during offpeak hours.

Finally, it may be feasible for certain

transit systems to utilize replenishable fuels— such
as refuse-derived fuel for electric power generation.

E. The pattern of truck and rail freight operations,
FREIGHT
OPERATIONS

especially truck operations in and around SMSA's and
rail freight service between urban centers, has a sig
nificant impact on the energy efficiency of goods dis
tribution within New England.

The states, in cooperation

with federal agencies and industry, can develop programs
for Improving the logistics of goods movement and ware
housing and for minimizing unnecessary consumption of
energy throughout the distribution system.

F. Increased intercity travel by rail or bus can result in
substantial savings in energy if travelers are diverted
INTERCITY
RAIL, BUS

from more energy-intensive means of transportation (e.g.,
from airlines or private automobiles).

The states

can

stimulate these alternative modes of intercity travel
by developing, in cooperation with industry and agencies
of the federal government, programs to improve intercity
rail and bus passenger service through improvements in
the existing rail beds, additions of new equipment, im
proved marketing and level of service, and more efficient
linkages to other transportation modes.
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SPACE HEATING AND COOLING
A. Space heating and cooling is currently one of the
largest sources of energy waste iin New England.
EFFICIENCY
STANDARDS:
NEW
CONSTRUCTION

It is

also the energy use function which can be most easily
managed through proper use of design principles and
through application of proven

technologies.

To assure that consumption is a primary factor in the
design of structures in the region, the states can
establish statewide performance standards0 for the
energy efficiency of all new buildings, including
specific standards for heat loss and energy consumption
per unit of usable space.

The standards can also in

clude stand-by provisions for discouraging the ex
panded use of specific fuels.

These standards could

apply to all new buildings, and to additions to current
structures.

The states can demonstrate the seriousness

of this program by instituting the standards immediately
for any new state office buildings.
B. The most serious space heating problems in the region
INCENTIVES
FOR
UPGRADING
CURRENT
SYSTEMS

are the lack of insulation and inefficient heating systems
extant among the old buildings in New England cities and
towns.

The states can stimulate the rate at which the

heating systems of these buildings are upgraded by pro
viding incentives through loans, loan guarantees, or tax
breaks for insulating and upgrading the heating systems
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of current buildings.
INCENTIVES
FOR
UPGRADING
CURRENT
SYSTEMS
(continued)

In addition, the states can fund,

programs which utilize underemployed or unemployed con
struction workers, and the management capability of
viable but temporarily struggling construction firms,
to improve where necessary the insulation qualities and
heating systems of selected existing New England buildings.

ELECTRICITY
A. Exterior lighting, particularly in commercial districts,
STANDARDS FOR
EXTERIOR
LIGHTING

can consume large amounts of electricity with very little
productive function performed.

The states can initiate

progress toward reducing unnecessary use of electricity
for exterior lighting by establishing statewide standards
for maximizing street lighting efficiency, for minimizing
exterior lighting of buildings beyond that required
for public safety, and for minimizing the use of
electric signs and displays.
8. Interior lighting of nonresidential buildings is only
STANDARDS FOR
INTERIOR
LIGHTING:
NEW
CONSTRUCTION

infrequently designed to minimize the use of electricity
without sacrificing illumination requirements.

The

states can cause a significant reduction in new demands
for electricity by establishing statewide electricity
use efficiency standards for interior illumination of
commercial, industrial, and institutional buildings,
and for the use of waste heat from lighting systems.
These standards could apply to all new buildings, and
to additions to current structures.
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C. The proliferation of electric appliances is one of the
APPLIANCE
LABELING

most significant factors in the rapid growth in the de
mand for electricity by the residential sector.

Un

fortunately, most consumers are not aware of the real
cost of many energy intensive conveniences (e.g., self-)
cleaning ovens).

The states can help consumers to seek

energy efficient appliances in their purchases by re
quiring that all electric appliances sold in New England
be labeled in such a manner as to inform the consumer
of the efficiency and/or the electricity consumption per
unit of operation of the appliance.

In addition, any

electrical equipment that includes a fast warm-up
feature (and thus consumes electricity at times other
than when in use) could be so labeled.

INDUSTRIAL AND UTILITIES PROCESS ENERGY
A. New England industry should be encouraged to use
INCENTIVES
FOR PROCESS
CHANGE

process energy as efficiently as possible.

In some

cases, however, a business may need to change its pro
duction process in order to reduce its energy consumption
per unit of output.
equipment.

This requires investment in capital

Depending on the remaining useful life of

existing equipment and the financial position of the
business— this investment may be neither justifiable
nor feasible.

In such situations,^the states can provide

financial incentives to industry to upgrade production
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processes in order to conserve energy.
INCENTIVES
FOR PROCESS
CHANGE
(continued)

Loans, loan

guarantees, or tax incentives can be made available to
small businesses for investments in industrial process
changes that will substantially reduce direct process
energy consumption.

In addition, the states could pro

vide technical assistance to businesses which are
interested in improving their use of process energy.
B. Industry can contribute substantially to regional
MATERIALS
REUSE

energy conservation by instituting improved methods
for managing the residuals from production processes.
The states can focus attention on the energy savings
associated with residuals management by helping
industry to identify, capture, and reuse valuable
materials from their collective waste streams, and by
identifying opportunities for industry to share waste
disposal facilities so that efficiencies of scale can
be achieved.

A program of information services and

technical assistance to accomplish these purposes
can be initiated, perhaps in conjunction with federal
programs in water quality improvement.
C. The states can encourage co-location of industries
CO-LOCATION

which can operate symbiotically on a materials or
energy basis, thus causing significant direct or in
direct energy savings.

Of particular importance is

the reuse of waste heat from industrial processes and
power generation, use of water from wastewater treat
ment plants, and use of the materials and energy in
municipal solid waste.
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Supplemental Sources - New England has more indigenous sources of energy
than are immediately apparent.

That little has been done to utilize

these sources is a reflection of the national syndrome to concentrate the
pursuit of new energy supplies on large-scale technologies and on sources
which are either controlled by today's energy industry or require massive
amounts of capital from a few companies to develop.

Excepting possible coal

reserves, New England's energy sources do not (yet) provide the promise
of base-load energy supply.

And yet they do offer considerable

opportunity

to whittle away at the region's reliance on oil while (hopefully) technolo
gists work on promising methods for replacing fossil fuels altogether.
What are the region's energy riches?

Among others:

. Enough solar radiation to make it possible, with today's
technology, to reliably satisfy 50-60 percent of the heating
requirements of a typical house or low-rise office building.
. Some of the "best" (e.g. consistently neither too strong nor
too gentle) winds in the country for powering windmill-based
electric generators.
. Tideswhich cause water to flood into, and recede from, some
coastal areas at a rate which exceeds the flow of many rivers.
. Variation in ocean water temperatures (thermal gradients)
which are sufficient for operating a heat engine (which can then
generate electricity).
. Large volumes of municipal solid waste, each ton of which con
tains almost 50 percent as much Btu value as coal.
. Large quantities of wood waste, much of which is currently
discarded after milling or wood finishing, and some of
which exists in the many unmanaged forests of the region.
Many of these sources of energy (particularly solar radiation, wind,
solid waste, and wood waste) can be exploited immediately as supplements
to the region's more traditional fuels.

Existing technologies, though not

yet fully commercialized, are more than adequate for converting these
renewable or replenishable sources of energy into useful forms.
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The extent to which renewable forms of energy will be used as
supplements to fossil fuels in New England depends upon many factors—
the economics of the application; public actions regarding property
taxation, building codes, and financing; policies of financial institutions;
and prices and availabilities of fossil fuels— to name a few.

However,

the potential contribution of certain of the renewable fuel sources is
significant enough to warrant a public effort to overcome some of the
barriers to their utilization.
For example, it is estimated that if all the new residential and
commercial buildings constructed in New England between 1980 and 1990 were
to have supplemental solar heating systems, then by 1990 about 10 percent
of the total energy demands of the residential and commercial sectors
(or 5 percent of total regional energy input requirements) would be satisfied by
the solar systems.

Any retrofitting of the heating or hot water systems

of existing structures would add to this amount.
Although it may seem optimistic to expect that solar heating systems
will become standard installations in new buildings by 1980, it is likely
that within the next five years commercialization and large scale production
will bring their cost down and make such systems economically attractive.
At the same time, the price of other sources of energy will be increasing—
thus potentially causing demands for solar systems to exceed expectations.
It is clearly in the best interest of New England to do whatever is
reasonable and feasible to help make solar heating a viable alternative

*

Based on data developed by Arthur D. Little, Inc. for the New England
Regional Commission.

40

to completely fossil-fuel fired or electric systems.

The fuel savings of 10

percent in the residential and commercial sectors combined, which is
roughly equivalent to 80,000 barrels per day of oil, is a significant
addition to a comprehensive energy conservation program.
Another example of a supplementary source of energy which is
awaiting exploitation is the combustible fraction of mixed municipal
waste.

It is now reasonably accepted that solid waste or refuse-

derived fuel can be a primary fuel for generating steam, or can be used
as a fuel supplement in electric utility boilers.

If the combustible

fraction of the solid waste generated by New England's largest metro
politan areas (i.e., with populations over 100,000) were recovered and
used by the region's utilities, the waste would satisfy over 5 percent
of their fossil fuel demands.

This would amount to slightly over

1 percent of New England's total energy requirements.
Recovery of resources from solid waste is one of the few energy
programs which has both substantial economic and environmental benefits.
Diversion of waste from land disposal sites avoids the many environmental
consequences which can occur as a result of landfilling (not to mention
the problems of locating and acquiring acceptable sites for the land
fills).

And instead of paying to be rid of the waste, the market will

pay to use it.

This does not mean that communities will make money from

selling their solid waste, or even that they will pay any less of a
"dump fee".

It does mean, however, that the waste will reenter the

economic stream and, consequently, will make a contribution to the New
England economy that would otherwise have been foregone.
New England has recognized these advantages of resource recovery.
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In Massachusetts, there are three recovery systems in operation (Saugus,
East Bridgewater, and Braintree), and a number of others in planning.
Connecticut, through the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority,
is planning a series of major recovery facilities.

Rhode Island has

recently formed a state authority to implement recovery projects.
It is estimated that over 50 percent of the region's metropolitan waste
is in the process of being considered for some'form of energy recovery.
This represents over three times the level of activity for the rest
of the country.
It is critical, at this juncture, to assure that these energy
recovery projects continue to proceed toward operations at a rapid pace,
and that unnecessary institutional or market barriers do not impede
or prevent their successful implementation.
The mechanisms listed below can be used by the states of New
England to encourage the prolification of energy production methods which
do not result in depletion of scarce and nonreplenishable fuel sources.
If successful, the effort to develop supplemental sources will have
a dual value to New England.
or more

First, by 1990 it is possible that 10 percent

of the regions energy requirements could be satisfied by

techniques such as solar heating, energy recovery from solid and wood
waste,and wind-based power generators. LTn conjunction with demand
management, therefore, this means that expected demands for fossil
fuels (and, to a lesser extent, nuclear fuels) can be reduced by
upwards of 30 percent by 1990.

In so doing, New England will have

reduced its incremental energy requirements (over 1974) from 60 percent
to about 15 percent.
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The second value of a successful supplemental sources program
is that progress on more sophisticated, and more significant,
technologies for converting the various forms of solar energy into
useful heat, electricity, or fuels will likely be accelerated.

The

primary stimulant to development will be a growing perception that
New England is serious about using energy production technologies
that are based on renewable fuel sources, and therefore that market
opportunities are both real and lucrative.
A. One of the most important determinants for proFINANCIAL
INCENTIVES

liferation of systems which produce supplemental
fuel or energy from renewable resources is the
financial viability of the individual projects
or applications.

The states and local communities

can increase the attractiveness of systems such as
solar heating and resource recovery by providing
tax incentives through mechanisms such as property
tax exemptions and accelerated depreciation allow
ances.

The states can also assist in the financing

of the applications by working with existing
financial institutions to assure the maximum availa
bility of various debt financing methods to investors
in the applications.

In addition, the states could

provide loans or loan guarantees directly in order to
underwrite the installation of supplemental systems.
(These mechanisms are discussed more fully in the section
on energy industry development.)
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B. In some cases, e.g. solar heating and cooling systems,
MARKET
DEVELOPMENT

the cost of available systems is currently high
because each system is a custom installation.

Mass

production, and standardization, of system components
will result in significant reductions in cost and
thus will increase their marketability.

The states

can accelerate the rate of progress toward mass
produced systems or system modules by creating
demand.

This demand can be created by

requiring, in the solar heating example, that new
state office buildings and schools install supple
mental fuel systems.

In the case of resource recovery,

the state public utility commissions can establish
guidelines for provisions for, and purchase of, supple
mental refuse-derived fuels by electric utilities.

In

certain circumstances (where state funds are involved
and feasibility is proven), the states can also stipu
late the use of refuse-derived fuels by mass transit
organizations which generate their own power, and by
developers of office or industrial complexes which
require substantial amounts of steam for space heating.
C. Sometimes the installation of supplemental fuel systems
PUBLIC LEGAL.&
ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTRAINTS

is constrained, rather than encouraged, by state or
local statutes or administrative procedures.

Building
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codes, zoning and other land use controls, and permit
PUBLIC LEGAL &
ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTRAINTS
(continued)

ting procedures should be scrutinized to ascertain
that they do not act as impediments to solar heating,
resource recovery, etc.

In some cases, new statutes

may be required that assure that the opportunity for
installation of these systems is maximized (e.g. Florida's
"right to sunlight" law).

In other cases, waivers of

the provisions of certain statutes may be necessary
(e.g. certain of the competitive bidding requirements
for public procurements).
D. The states can facilitate the successful application
TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE
AND
INFORMATION
DISSEMINATION

of supplemental fuel systems, and can improve the
likelihood that they will receive serious consideration
for application where feasible, by providing assistance
to individuals and organizations who are (or could be)
considering installation of such systems.

The assis

tance could range from the provision of direct advisory
services to the maintenance of a technical information
clearinghouse.

One possibility for the clearinghouse

concept is to provide a diagnostic and matching service
through which an individual could determine the range of
feasible supplemental fuel systems which could meet his
needs.

A list of New England-based organizations and

New England-produced equipment.which,are available
could also be produced.
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Securing Supplies of Fossil Fuels
The energy conservation program can bring New England very close
to a condition of zero growth in the consumption of scarce fossil fuels.
This laudable achievement would do much to protect the region from future
escalations in the price of fossil fuels and from the uncertain future
supplies of oil and natural gas.

Conservation does not, unfortunately,

solve the region's energy security problems— it simply prevents their
worsening.

For even under the most optimistic conservation scenario,

New England will require, in 1990, at least as much gasoline, distillate
and residual oils, and natural gas as it did in 1974.
Thus, until the region can avail itself of technologies which pro
duce energy from renewable sources of fuel, it is necessary to continue a
degree of reliance (albeit a lesser degree) on oil.*

The program strategy

is directed toward making this reality as manageable as possible, and
especially to develop for New England a greater degree of influence over
its sources of oil and gas.
Georges Bank Development** - Georges Bank, which lies about 30 to 200 miles
offshore New England, is potentially one of the country's most signifi
cant resource reserves:
. The Georges Bank fishery currently yields over 10 percent of
the nation's fish landings. If all the fish caught on the Bank
were landed in the United States, this percentage would increase
to almost 25 percent.

*

Later sections will address the contribution which coal and nuclear
energy can make toward moving the region away from its oil base. The
authors of this report tend to consider even coal and nuclear alternatives
to be interim measures, i.e., technologies which fill the time gap between
oil depletion and large-scale utilization of solar energy and/or hydrogen.

** Many of the data presented in this section are from the Arthur D. Little,
Inc. report to the Energy Program of the New England Regional Commission
entitled "Petroleum Development in New England" (April 1975).
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The geological formation of the Bank may hold 5 percent or more of
the country's recoverable oil reserves, as well as substantial
volumes of natural gas.
However, whereas it is proven that Georges Bank can yield over a
billion pounds of fish per year (year in and year out), its value as a
source of oil or gas will not be known unitl exploration is completed. On the
basis of known geological formations, experts have estimated that total
recoverable Georges Bank hydrocarbons (crude oil plus associated gases)
may amount to 8.9 billion barrels.

In addition, there may exist approxi

mately 29 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Georges Bank gas fields.
At New England's 1974 levels of consumption, these reserves amount to
approximately 15 years of oil and over 100 years of natural gas.*

If these

reserves are proven (and from 2 to 5 years are needed for exploration),
it will take anywhere from 5 to 10 years before production of crude oil
begins, i.e., the country will probably not have Georges Bank oil to
refine until the mid 1980's.
From New England's viewpoint, Georges Bank is potentially the most
secure source of oil and natural gas--if exploration proves developable
quantities of either, or both, fuels.

Except for the possible coal de

posits in Southeastern Massachusetts and Rhode Island, it is closer to
the most populated areas of the region than any other source of fossil
fuels.

Thus transportation penalties, such as the over $.50 per million

Btu's which New England pays to bring natural gas from the Southwest
(an amount which matches the wellhead price of the gas itself), will be
reduced substantially.
*

More importantly, the proximity of the

These reserve lives are based on a simple ratio of recoverable reserves
to New England demand. The high number for natural gas reflects the
current minor amount of gas consumed in the region. In practice, de
velopment of the oil and gas reserves will occur over roughly a 20 year
period. Thus, much of the natural gas would likely be exported to other
parts of the country unless there were reason and the will to keep it
in the ground.
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source to the region will probably mean that New Englanders become in
volved politically, economically, and socially in its development.

This

involvement will open up lines of communication with the energy industry
which have not existed in the past.

The states will develop a stake in

the energy industry and the industry, in turn, will develop a stake in
New England.

This process can result in a greater degree of control for

the region over its energy supply future.*
The chances

are that there is either a developable quantity ofgas

or oil in the Bank's geological formations,

and that the first fuel that

is proven to be present in economic quantities will be the one developed.
If the amount of recoverable gas reserves under Georges Bank is somewhere
near that which the experts are predicting, New England may find itself
in the unusual position of having easy access to large quantities of natural
gas.

This possibility, the ramifications of which have yet to be explored,

could have substantial implications in future regional industrial develop
ment— especially development of industries that use methane as a feed
stock as well as
Development

those that require natural gasfor process energy.
of Georges Bank oil or gas hasmore impact on New

England than increasing the security of energy supply.
economic and environmental consequences as well.

There will be

Like most large-scale

developments, the impacts from producing oil or gas on Georges Bank are
mixed and open td interpretation and argument by those who (rightfully)
*

On the negative side, the process of increasing the region's involve
ment with the energy industry can also result in a greater degree of
control over the region's affairs by the energy industry. Which out
come occurs will largely rest on the actions of the region's political
leaders.
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add their values to the cold data of the analyst.
From an economic point of view, development of Georges Bank could
result in anywhere from 5,000 to 12,000 new jobs.

The degree to which

these jobs will be filled from within the region depends largely on the
amount of equipment fabrication and assembly conducted in New England, on
the skill mix available at the time of development, on the degree to which
training is provided to the New England labor force, and on the outcome
of negotiations between regional public officials and the members of the
energy industry.
In addition to jobs, development of Georges Bank will likely result
in substantial revenues to the coastal states.

The amount of these

revenues will be determined on the basis of negotiations between the
states and the federal government over the degree to which coastal areas
should share in the revenues from the leasing of offshore land.
Georges Bank development also raises the possibility of a serious
economic conflict.

The New England fishing industry recently topped

$100 million in fish landings.

With the 200-mile resource zone established,

the fishing industry can be expected to expand in its economic importance
to New England.

However, exploitation of Georges Bank for its energy re

sources may seriously constrain the growth, or even threaten the viability,
of one of the region's oldest and most productive industries. The conflicts
between the two industries arise because of: (1) space competition— offshore
due to the area taken up for drilling rigs, pipelines, undersea completions,
etc., all of which interfere with bottom fishing; and onshore due to
competition for dock space, support services, and parts; (2) the potential
for marine life-damaging offshore oil spills; and (3) competition for
skilled labor.

Some individuals think that these conflicts can be
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minimized if someone is able to persuade the two industries to
cooperate within a management scheme which allows each to benefit
without overly taxing either.
The environmental impacts of offshore oil or gas development are
difficult to assess without better information on the amount and
location of the reserves.

However, the risks of chronic small oil

spills or infrequent large ones, and their negative impact on the
marine ecosystem are high enough to warrant concern

by a region which

appreciates the intrinsic value of the sea and the coastal zone.
Many analysts believe, however, that the risk of a spill from offshore
drilling and oil production is less than from the current traffic of
small oil-laden tankers moving into New England harbors.
In addition to spills, offshore production of oil may cause con
siderable shoreside development.

If poorly controlled, this development

would reduce the environmental quality of certain of the region's coastal
areas.
Overall, production of oil or gas from Georges Bank could be very
beneficial to New England--particularly if the health and vitality of
the region's fishing industry can be preserved, and if the environmental
quality of New England's coastal zone can be maintained.

Listed below

are some mechanisms which can be used to encourage prudent development
of Georges Bank and to assure participation of New England in the reaping
of the fruits of this development.
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A. Although prior determination of Georges Bank re
INTERSTATE
COOPERATION

serves would much simplify and improve planning
for related petroleum development, national objec
tives will not forgive the added time necessary to
thoroughly determine the resource base.

As it is,

Georges Bank is under federal control and all de
cisions relating to the area are under federal
jurisdiction.

However, the contiguous coastal

states could establish a system whereby they will
cooperate in the planning for potential shoreside
development and will not be induced to compete for
revenue-producing facilities by lowering environ
mental standards.

Interstate consultation through

NERCOM or some other regional body should be used
to avoid damaging interstate conflicts.
The states could take steps to coordinate their
coastal zone management (CZM) programs so as to
achieve site pre-designation and reduce the general
parameters the federal law requires vis-a-vis con
sideration of facilities in the national interest.
Site pre-designation would allow the states to en
courage development in areas chosen by the states,
not the developer; would allow for more specific
CZM planning and drive to federal acceptance of
each state's CZM program; and would prevent facility
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INTERSTATE
COOPERATION
(continued)

establishment according to a "most regulations
overlooked" competition amonq the states.
Further, the states could support a regional council
responsible for OCS information gathering and dis
semination so as to: (a) simplify communications
among the federal government, developers, and state
governments; (b) provide baseline data that can be
the grounds for coordinated interstate decisions;
(c) serve as a conduit for decision making for all
interested parties; and (d) develop state expertise
in impact assessment.
B. The exploration process and, clearly, the production
phase of OCS development will require many skilled

JOB
TRAINING

laborers; including welders, pipe-fitters, adminis
trators, work boat crews, construction labor, and
maintenance labor.

Unless the region takes steps now

to train local citizens for these skills, labor is
quite likely to be imported.

Service costs (such

as those associated with housing, education, and
wastewater treatment) to communities which host in
migrants but still carry heavy rolls of unemployed
persons will rise at a time when these costs can be
least afforded.

The region should develop and en

hance curricula at New England trade schools and
universities so as to create a labor force that will
be able to meet the employment demands of OCS
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JOB
TRAINING
(continued)

activity.

Negotiations with developers may release

private capital for this training, although the need
is pressing enough to demand a restructuring of current
course schedules and a commitment of public resources.

C. The region must establish consistent and enforce
ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY

able criteria so as to maintain the character of the
valuable coastline as well as to provide restrictions
that will enhance and maintain a potentially competing
use of the Bank--fisheries.

The states have the

power, especially through their CZM programs and
various siting-related regulations, to control or
direct shoreside development so as to manage and pro
tect the valuable and fragile coastal resources.

The

federal government has the authority to include what
ever stipulations it feels are necessary to allow
fisheries to coexist with OCS oil development.
Ideally, such stipulations should be identified
before lease sale, allowing bidders to discount
possible increased costs to achieve those stipu
lations.

In a sense, then, federal revenues de

crease and the national public subsidizes OCS protein
production.

Stipulations should include

a require

ment for pipeline burial, traffic lanes for service
vessels, navigation aids on platforms, development
of a full liability structure, and, where possible,
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ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
(continued)

staged development of those areas in direct con
flict with prime fishing grounds.

D. A major renewable resource for New England lies
PROTEIN
VERSUS OIL
PRODUCTION

just offshore--the Georges Bank fishery.

At present,

the Bank lies under international control and the
majority of the fish captured are taken by foreign
distant-water fleets.

The area, however, could pro

vide over 25 percent of domestic fisheries production
and consequently represents an enormously valuable
resource for the region— both in terms of developing
indigenous employment as well as providing an export
item that is soon to have major worldwide importance
as food crises intensify.

Fisheries production from

Georges Bank also represents a tremendous monetary
value which will increase substantially once the
200-mile resource zone is implemented.
management, the longevity of the

With sound

resource rivals

any other use of the OCS and argues for coexistence,
not competition,between oil and fish production.
The region should, then, continue to press for
intelligent implementation of the 200-mile United
States resource zone off the New England coast.
As the legislation leaves fisheries management to
regional councils, the region should prepare a
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PROTEIN
VERSUS OIL
PRODUCTION
(continued)

development plan that can serve as the foundation for
negotiations with federal agencies, the oil industry,
and the fishing industry regarding establishment of a
system for managing the Bank's dual resources.

The

plan should also define a process for achieving interand intra-industry cooperation in offshore operations
and onshore operations and development.

The planning

process could be facilitated if data are developed
which allow planners to:
- Make a determination of the oil-fisheries physical
competition in order to assess the time lost, pro
duction effects, and operating costs under various
development patterns.

Vessel traffic, exploratory

rig location, pipeline location (including costs of
burial), production platform location, debris treat
ment, labor transfer, and onshore effects in terms
of wharfage, fuel parts, and maintenance are among
the more important factors.
- Identify, from the information developed, which federal
OCS stipulations are required.

A priority list of such

stipulations can then be developed, and pressure could
be exerted through the New England Congressional Dele-r
gation and individual state actions to ensure that
such stipulations are adopted.

Stipulations must be

announced before tract sale and, consequently, this
is an immediate issue.
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PROTEIN
VERSUS OIL
PRODUCTION
(continued)

- Determine which fisheries infrastructure is most
suitable for coexistence with the oil industry
and provides the most employment without reducing
production, paying attention to energy costs,
technological assessment of processing and
distribution, and the economic parameters of a
high employment infrastructure.
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Petroleum Facilities* - New England currently has no petroleum refining
capability; all of the oil products that are consumed come from refineries
in the Middle Atlantic states, the Southwest, or foreign countries.

The

primary reason for this lack of refining capacity is that the major oil
companies simply have not had sufficient reasons to invest in new capa
city in New England as opposed, for example, to investing in expansion
of existing capacity elsewhere in the country.

Although many independents

have shown an interest in building a New England refinery, the combination
of poor public relations, insufficient planning, opposition from environ
mentalists, uncertain financing, and inadequate guarantees of crude oil
has been deadly to each proposed venture.
It is not that the New England market cannot support one, or two,
or even three refineries— the Boston, Providence, New Haven, and
Portsmouth/Portland demand areas are more than adequate markets for
typical modern refining and distribution activities.

Without a reliable

and preferably close supply of crude oil, however, it is unlikely that
the region will witness any significant amount of petroleum facility
development in the foreseeable future, if ever.
Why, then, should New England concern itself with the refinery
question?

There are at least four reasons.

First, if Georges Bank

proves to contain developable amounts of oil, the entire outlook for
New England-based refining capacity could change dramatically.
the region should begin to prepare for such a possibility.

Thus,

Second,

it may be feasible to make some rather creative arrangements for

*

Many of the data presented in this section are from the Arthur D. Little,
Inc. report to the Energy Program of the New England Regional Commission
entitled "Petroleum Development in New England" (April 1975).
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reliably bringing crude oil into New England.

A reliable source of crude

could cause investments in New England refining capacity to be attractive
Third, the states will, from time to time, need to respond to the
proposals of entrepreneurs who may be able to put all the pieces
together to build a New England refinery.

It behooves the region to

help these entrepreneurs to do a good job in organizing and designing
their projects.

Finally, it may be in the best interest of New England

to refine at least some of its oil products within the region rather
than to import them from other regions or countries.

This is parti

cularly true for the more essential fuels— residual and distillate oils.
Research has shown that properly designed and sited New England
refineries will contribute significantly to the economics of the areas
near them, and that the environmental impacts from construction and
operation need not be severe.

For example, refining operations could

generate anywhere from 1500 to 8000 new jobs, depending on the size
of the refineries.

With proper training, upwards of 90 percent of

these new jobs could be filled by members of the New England labor force.
In addition, each 250,000 barrels per day refining could contribute
upwards of $20 million per year in state and local tax revenues.
Installation of a petrochemical complex in conjunction with refining
operations could add over 1500 new jobs and $10 million per year in tax
revenues.

Furthermore, production of petrochemicals in New England

could have a substantial multiplier effect on industrial development.
The environmental consequences of refining are closely tied to the
siting of the facility and the control of land use around it.*

The

* Analysis has shown that a refinery need not be located on the coast.
The additional cost incurred by locating the facility 25 miles
inland amounts to somewhere around 1/4 cent per gallon of final product
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enormous supply of water needed for refining operations requires that a
facility be located on a major water body.
near a major market area.

Economics dictate a location

Thus, in New England a refinery would have to

be sited on the coast, or on either the Connecticut, Merrimack, Andros
coggin,

or Kennebec Rivers.

Use of advanced pollution control technology

will not completely eliminate pollutants in the water discharges of re
fineries; however, in combination with location on a large flowing river,
control technology can mitigate against environmental damage from the
remaining pollutants.

The most severe and difficult to control pollutant

from refinery operations is hydrocarbon emissions to the atmosphere.

Al

though some refinery designers claim that in Europe, for example, refineries
are being build with little or no detectable hydrocarbon emissions, it seems
reasonable to assume that until improved control techniques are demonstrated,
a refinery in New England will frequently violate current ambient air
quality standards for total hydrocarbons.

Thus, is is possible that EPA

could deny a new refinery its permit to operate.
There is insufficient evidence showing that spills of crude oil
are less damaging to the environment than spills of oil products.

Thus,

delivery of crude to New England for refining probably is only mar
ginally "better" than delivery of final product.

It is true, however,

that a system of crude delivery by very large tankers to a deepwater
terminal could reduce the chronic spillage associated with the current
system of small tankers off-loading product in New England's shallow ports.
A fixed or floating deepwater terminal for receipt of crude oil (probably
from foreign sources) makes sense for the region if it is conceived as
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part of a total time-phased system of petroleum acquisition, processing,
and distribution.

The possibility of crude production from Georges

Bank looms as the most significant, and uncertain, deterrent to a
deepwater terminal.

For the terminal may be quickly obsoleted by

development of oil on the Bank.*
Whether or not refining facilities are built in New England, it is
important that the region has adequate storage capacity for essential
fuels such as residual and distillate fuel oils.

The current capacity

to carry from 20 to 25 days of inventory is not sufficient protection
against the risk of disruptions in the supply of petroleum products.
A doubling of storage capacity would not be unreasonable, for it would
provide enough time for emergency measures, such as reallocation of
domestic refinery output, to be put into effect.**

Industry, however,

has not been anxious to increase product storage capacity.

Land for

tank farms is scarce, and there is little (if any) financial incentive
for the oil companies to invest scarce capital in essentially nonproductive
contingency facilities.

* Even with crude oil coining into New England by pipeline from Georges
Bank, it may be possible to utilize a deepwater terminal for other purposes,
including receipt of oil products or other liquid materials. To date,
this possibility has not been explored sufficiently.
** It is interesting to note that a typical refinery carries about 45 days
of crude storage. Thus, each New England refinery would add substantially
to the region's ability to survive a short-term supply crisis.
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The NERCOM report on petroleum development summarizes the value of
New England refining capacity when it states (the parenthetical phrases
are added by the authors of this report):
"...Given the present state of U. S. (crude oil)
production and an expected future need to continue
to use foreign crude oil supplies, the establishment
of a truly secure supply can only occur with United States
based production...Thus the OCS potential on Georges Bank
offers the greatest regional chance for improved supply
security...Without an increase in United States production
(if crude oil), a regional refinery based on foreign crude
offers a modest improvement in supply security simply
because the refinery is regionally located and the operator
has a strong financial incentive to keep it supplied with
feedstock
'V
Thus, whereas New England may highly favor (under proper management)
regional-based production and refining of Georges Bank oil and increases
in the capacity for storing petroleum products, the question of the
desirability of refining capacity and, possibly, a deepwater terminal
based on foreign crude is one which can be answered only on a caseby-case basis.
Listed below are mechanisms which the region can use to help for
mulate petroleum facility development programs.
A. The region should support and assist the efforts of
SUPPORT
OF
REFINERY
AND
DEEPWATER
TERMINAL
PROPOSALS

any of the various states, or individual entrepreneurs,
to attract and site an inland oil refinery that meets
accepted environmental standards and for which there
are reasonable assurances that financing is available
and that a reliable supply of crude oil can be arranged.
A plan should be developed by the potential refiner, in
conjunction with state and/or regional public bodies,
for securing crude oil from potential Georges Bank pro-
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ducers in sufficient quantities to support refinery
SUPPORT
OF
REFINERY
AND
DEEPWATER
TERMINAL
PROPOSALS
(continued)

operations.
The refinery should be designed to produce a high
fuel oil products slate initially, with plans to
produce maximum gasoline and to add a petrochemical
complex at a later time.

Here, also, interstate co

operation is necessary so as to maximize revenues,
facilitate CZM planning, and design the best regional
product mix.
To foster and promote petroleum facilities in New
England--supported by crude from Georges Bank and/or
tanker delivery to shoreside or deepwater terminals—
wiMt require provisions for action orientation at
the regional (and, therefore, individual state) level.
Capability to support petroleum facility development
is explicitly linked to government's ability to take
the initiative.

LegaT, institutional^ and economic

development mechanisms need to be formulated and
implemented to afford the region and the states
capability to serve as catalysts for oil-related
resource development.

A regional entity should take

the initiative to provide a service to the states in
two key functional areas:

energy information and

technical assistance.
-Integrated Information Services can provide a basis
upon which state level decision makers can proceed
with positive governmental actions on those issues
that extend beyond state boundaries.

Issues of multi-
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state interest associated with petroleum development
SUPPORT
OF
REFINERY
AND
DEEPWATER
TERMINAL
PROPOSALS
(continued)

include:

CZM planning, environmental/economic impact

statements, and social service demands that cross
state lines.

These issues must be addressed from a

position of strength and capability to formulate
solutions equitable to a majority of those concerned.
The regional entity would gather, analyze, and dis
tribute petroleum development-related information,
studies, reports (gathered from federal, interstate,
state, local, and private sectors) to state and local
level decision makers with analysis and recommendations
that emphasize interstate concerns.

The use of a

common information system by individual states will
promote understanding and cooperation toward the
equitable siting of petroleum development facilities.
Technical Assistance and Advice can synthesize and
prioritize the bulk of regional technical information
into suitable baseline data sets for petroleum develop
ment decision making.

A technical staff composed of

representatives from the industrial development, govern
mental, and related resource use sectors can address
legal/institutional, petroleum development, environmental,
etc. issues so as to provide an interstate implementation
strategy.

A combination of an integrated and credible

information base with technical assistance and advice
will promote bi- and/or multi-state decisions con
cerning petroleum facility development and promote
them in a manner so as to maintain environmental
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controls, land/water use restrictions, and the traditional protections of the public's health and welfare.
B. To reduce vulnerability, incentives for the oil industry
PRODUCT
STORAGE
AND
DISTRIBUTION

to increase the storage capacity for residual and
distillate oils to a minimum of 40 days should be
investigated.

Current federal price control regula

tions Should be relaxed to permit:

(a) inventorying

of fuel oils during seasons in which prices are lower
and (b) sale at relatively higher peak-season prices.
Accelerated depreciation of new storage facilities
also should be allowed by the federal and state
governments.

An effort to identify sites should be

undertaken now; consultation with industry representa
tives should be initiated.
The design, siting, and construction of product pipe
lines from refineries and/or product storage areas
to major distribution or consumption centers also can
be facilitated.

This will reduce significantly the

environmental and safety hazards associated with
product-carrying tanker distribution systems.
C. Every effort should be made to provide employment
EMPLOYMENT

opportunities for regional inhabitants in the event
of petroleum facility development.

Educational pro

grams fostered at the state level will reduce the
possibility of labor import into the region.
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D. A refinery is estimated to require 1000 acres of land.
SITING

Site predesignation by the states will facilitate the
location of energy facilities, minimize the negative
impacts of their location, reduce the co>ts and delays
associated with current procedures of siting, and
indicate to developers the commitment of the region
to foster facility siting within New England.

A drive

toward sensible petroleum facility siting and develop
ment could include:
- Coordination with ongoing efforts, especially those
directed towards developing criteria to be used by
states in selecting sites for energy facilities.
- Technical assistance provided to the states for site
definition.
- Development of a regional environmental impact state
ment for sites recommended by the states.

Those sites

where interstate impacts can be expected should be
noted, as should mechanisms for the amelioration of
those impacts.

This will allow for selection of the

most suitable sites for development.
- Preparation of programs for acquiring options on
land for facilities sites.
- Preparation of promotional literature to advertise
the availability of publicly approved sites.
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Natural Gas* - Although natural gas consumption per capita is lower in
New England than in any other region of the country, the region cannot
afford to ignore the serious problems which are occurring in the availa
bility of traditional domestic gas supplies.

Approximately 40 percent of

New England's households are customers of natural gas distribution companies.

S

Of these, over 50 percent (approximately 800,000 customers) use

gas for space heating, the remainder use it for cooking and for appliances
such as clothes dryers.

Whereas only about 25 percent of the nation's

natural gas is consumed, on the average, by the residential sector, in
New England the residential sector accounts for over 50 percent of the
region's consumption of gas.

This statistic is a double-edged sword.

Federal Power Commission gas curtailment policy is currently based on
prioritization of consumer classes rather than on proportional cutbacks.
With residential consumption receiving the highest priority, and because
of the region's consumption profile, New England stands to suffer the
least cutback in its gas supplies.

However, if shortages reach the pro

portions which many experts are predicting, then New England households
may be proportionately harder hit than in any other region.
New England's distance from its sources of gas, and its expensive
distribution system (very little of the fixed cost of local distribution
and service is absorbed by large industrial users, because there are very
few large industrial users) have resulted in regional gas prices which
for residential customers are 82 percent higher than the national average
and almost twice as high as those paid by households in the East North

*

Much of the data presented in this section are from the report by the
Institute of Gas Technology for the Energy Program of the New England
Regional Commission entitled "Gas Industry Development in New England"
(June 1975).
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Central states.

Similarly, New England industry pays 156 percent more

for its natural gas than does the average United States industrial firm.
These high prices have probably been the primary reason for the region's
reasonably efficient use of natural gas— very little of this valuable
fuel is wasted on such unfitting uses as the firing of utility boilers.*
Very little can be done to reduce the price paid by the region for
its gas.
of

However, New England can take steps to assure that supplies

natural gas will not fall short of those required.

The region's

security of supply will be maximized if Georges Bank gas fields are
proven and developed.

This possibility alone justifies a reasonable

effort to maintain the region's existing gas industry and the distribution
infrastructure.

Without a major find of gas fields on Georges Bank, New

England must rely on three methods for protecting against dwindling
supplies of natural gas:

(1) increased development of ot he r domestic

sources of traditional natural gas; (2) development of programs to in
crease

supplemental gas supplies from imported LNG (liquefied natural

gas) or from synthetic natural gas (SNG); and (3) maintenance of a program
which assures New England an equitable allocation of available domestic
pipeline gas.
It is estimated that upwards of 40 percent of New England's natural
gas requirements could be met by LNG, and that an additional 30 percent
or so could be met by SNG produced from naphtha and coal.

In combination

with anticipated availability of domestic gas, these amounts would be
sufficient, under conditions of maximum conservation, to avoid serious

*

The "best" use of natural gas is as a feedstock for chemical production.
A "very good" use is for functions that require relatively high tempera
tures and clean and even burning, such as cooking. A "poor" use is for
large-scale stationary sources that easily can use fuels of lesser
qua!ity.
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shortages of gas to New England's consumers over the next fifteen years.
The mechanisms listed below can be used by New England in developing
an agressive program to prevent a serious gas supply problem.
A. The relatively low price of natural gas acts as a
deterrent to the substantial investments required
PRICE
*
DEREGULATION

for new exploration and development.

In order to

provide industry with an incentive to increase the
supply of traditional domestic pipeline gas, the
region could support deregulation of the price of
new gas, i.e. of the gas resulting from new wells.
Before announcing firm support for one or more of
the possible deregulation schemes, however, the
region should explore in depth the time-phased
impacts on New England of various forms of price
decontrol--including phased, partial, selective, and
blanket programs.

B. The importance of supplemental gas supplies to the
SUPPLEMENTAL
SUPPLIES

region is clear.

Over the next decade, New England

must turn to imported LNG, and to synthetic gas from
coal or petroleum feedstocks to satisfy its require
ments for natural gas.

*

The region can facilitate the

For an excellent discussion of deregulation, see Part 4 of the report to
NERCOM by the Institute of Gas Technology entitled "Gas Industry De
velopment in New England" (June 1975).
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importation of LNG by supporting the gas industry in
SUPPLEMENTAL
SUPPLIES
(continued)

its attempts to achieve Federal Power Commission
approvals of their import applications.

The region

can also encourage (through political assistance,
direct investments, or ERDA-funded joint ventures
with the gas utilities) one or more projects for the
gasification of ex-regional or regional coal.

The

major obstacle to such a program is gaining assurances
that the resultant gas is transmitted to New England
via existing pipelines without unneccessary imposition
of constraints by the FPC.
C. As domestic supplies of natural gas continue to decline,
ALLOCATION
OF
DOMESTIC
GAS

the FPC, on its own or under pressure from Congress,
can be expected to experiment with various forms of
curtailment plans.

New England should not only be

fully cognizant of any new developments regarding
curtailment, but it should also be well informed on the
status of gas supply and demand in the region and in
other regions, and should aggressively promote and
argue plans which provide, equitably, for New England's
needs.

This is perhaps the most critical short-term

supply-related requirement from those who assume
responsibility for energy management in the region.
D. New England, as the closest land mass to Georges Bank,
OCS GAS

should encourage industry to assure that adequate and
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appropriate facilities for bringing natural gas into
OCS GAS
(continued)

New England can be sited and developed in a timely
manner.

In addition, the gas industry should be en

couraged to have adequate facilities in place for the
liquefaction and storage in New England of OCS gas
during off-peak seasons.

These facilities could also

be used for storing domestic pipeline gas.

The region

should determine the FPC position on such storage, and
negotiate, if necessary, for FPC concurrence with a
plan which benefits New England and which makes sense
to the gas developers.

Furthermore, it behooves the

region to start considering the industrial development
implications of abundant and close gas supplies.
Planned use of this potential gas for purposes which
are sound from both a resource management and economic
point of view will increase the likelihood that New
England will receive multiple benefits from exploitation
of Georges Bank.
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Coal Development -

Over 25 percent of New England's power generating

capacity was either designed to burn coal (if necessary) or has burned
coal sometime during its operating lifetime.

By 1974, however, less

than 5 percent of the region's electricity was generated from coal.

In

response to air quality regulations, by the early 1970's most utilities
had opted to burn oil so as to reduce particulate emissions.

Thus,

whereas in 1966 almost 11 million tons of coal were used in New England, by
1974 regional consumption was under 2.5 million tons--a decline of over 75
percent.

As recently as 1970, over 70 percent more coal was brought into

New England than in 1974.
Coal is the only fossil fuel which may exist in quantity within New
England's boundaries.

It is also the only domestic fuel source which

is known to exist in sufficient enough quantities that its depletion will
not be an issue during this century.
solution to the fuel quandary.

Thus, coal might appear to be the

The coal solution, however, is costly.

Areas which are rich in surface coal are hesitant to permit massive
stripping of their land and the devastation of fragile and ancient eco
systems which occasionally occurs as a result of strip mining.

Deep-

mined coal can be less risky environmentally, but the impact on miner's
health has been more costly than even available health statistics show.*
Because of its bulk, coal is also very costly to transport, store, and
handle.

Finally, the burning of coal results in large amounts of air

pollutants and enormous quantities of bottom ash, which must be disposed
of in an environmentally sound manner.

*

A 1,000 megawatt coal-burning

It has been reported that the amount of insurance claims for treatment of
"black lung disease" amounts to a cost that is roughly equivalent to $4.00
per ton of coal mined. The significance of this cost is dramatized when
one considers that the average U. S. price of coal in 1974 was only about
$12.00 per ton.
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power plant, for example, generates somewhere around 490,000 tons of
ash per year— which over 20 years will result in a pile 40 feet deep
over 95 acres.
Many of the transportation and user problems which affect the
attractiveness of coal can be reduced or eliminated if the coal is
gasified at or near the mine.

The resultant gas (mostly methane) can

be fed into existing natural gas transmission pipelines.
however, is also costly:

Gasification,

(a) compared to the "raw" coal, the resultant

gas may cost two or three times as much per million Btu's; and (b)
gasification results in the consumption of anywhere from almost two to
almost three times as much coal per million Btu's of delivered fuel than
do deep mining or strip mining without gasification.*

Proposals have

also been put fourth to transport coal in a slurry via pipeline to
distant demand areas.
gasified.

The coal could then be used as is, or it could be

This alternative is also costly, especially because of the

investment required for the slurry pipelines, pumping stations, and
processing equipment at destination points.
These problems are particularly real for New England— over the last
decade, the region's coal handling equipment has been dismantled, and
the region's railroads and rail beds have declined to the point where it
is no longer possible (without substantial capital investment) to bring
coal into the region in any quantity.

Similarly, most of New England's

electric utilities are unprepared to receive coal and to dispose of the
ash residues.

*

For additional information on the energy efficiencies and subsidies
associated with various energy production technologies, see the report
to the U. S. Department of the Interior by Development Sciences Inc.
entitled "A Study to Develop Energy Estimates of Merit for Selected
Fuel Technologies" (September 1975).
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New England may have its own supply of coal.

The Narraganset Basin,

which includes parts of Southeastern Massachusetts and Rhode Island, may
contain large amounts of high quality coal.

Until the reserves are proven,

however, it is no more certain that this coal is developable than it is
that Georges Bank oil is developable.

Thus, a strategy which relies on

a supply of indigenous coal would be irresponsible.

Even if Narraganset

coal is developable, the region will have to do a careful analysis of the
impacts of mining and processing on the critical environmental and water
resources of that part of New England so that conscientious decisions
can be made on how development should occur and on the tradeoffs associated
with various levels and forms of development.
Despite the enormous costs associated with the mining, processing,
and consumption of coal, it is irrefutable that it represents one of the
most secure supplies of fossil fuels available to New England.

The region

cannot afford to not make a concerted effort to determine how some of the
problems associated with coal can be solved.

Indeed, the challenge is to

convert some of these problems into opportunities.

The mechanisms

suggested below may help formulate a program toward these ends.
A. The possibility that coal reserves exist in the NarraINDIGENOUS
COAL
RESERVES

gansett Basin offer New England with a potential opportunity to supply regional utilities with a secure fuel
source to replace some of its dependence on imported
residual oil.

It also offers a potential opportunity

to produce rather large amounts of synthetic natural
gas for residential and industrial uses.

The coal,
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however, is likely to require deep mining, and lies
INDIGENOUS
COAL
RESERVES

under land

the ownership of which is highly fragmented

and which is in some places highly developed for urban
functions.

Thus, in addition to the environmental

and economic tradeoffs which must be understood, the
region will also need to address some extremely intri
cate legal and institutional problems.

For now, New

England should support the effort to determine the
extent, quality, and location of potential coal reserves.
Once this information is in hand (and assuming it
indicates a considerable and developable reserve), a
comprehensive work program should be implemented to
determine alternative development strategies (including
alternative uses of the coal) and their consequences
to the region, the individual states, and the involved
local communities.
Before the region does anything to increase the avail
COAL
IMPORTATION

ability of coal to New England's utilities, and before
actions are taken to improve the coal transportation,
handling, and storage infrastructure, it is critical
to determine whether or not the region wants to encourage
an increased use of coal.

This is both a question of

economics and environmental quality.

If the answer to

this question is positive, then New England must deter
mine what investments are required by whom in order to
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again bring quantities of coal into the region by rail
COAL
IMPORTATION
(continued)

or barge. Once these investments are determined, the
states can define methods for their financing, including
securing funding from federal sources.

Additionally,

the states may find it attractive to enter into formal
agreements with coal-producing states for joint develop
ment (perhaps in conjunction with a group of utility
companies) of new mines.

The mining process could then

be designed so as to maximize the protection of the
miners' health and of the host state's natural environ
ment.
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Trade Arrangements - The world's oil producing and exporting countries are
beginning to realize that the enormous flow of foreign currency into their
economies as payment for their crude oil can cause substantial internal
problems relating to the distribution of this new wealth, the investment
of the accumulated capital, and the balancing of physical, economic, and
human development.

At the same time, some oil exporting countries are

concerned about the declining values of oil importers' currencies.

More

importantly, there is a recognition by some of the exporting countries
that they must avoid causing serious damage to the economies of the nations
which must buy their oil.

Furthermore, some of the exporting countries

also recognize that the lifetime of their oil reserves is limited, and
that they must begin soon to develop or acquire alternative methods for
satisfying their own energy requirements after the oil is gone and once
they, too, need to fuel the forces of industrialization

and economic

growth.
Complicating some of these already difficult economic problems is the
growing awareness by developing countries that the quality of their futures
may be constrained by inadequate indigenous supplies of, or access to,
protein sources.
The United States, on the other hand, is handsomely stocked with the
planning and management expertise, the know-how to design and deliver
health and educational services, the technological capability, the food
resources, and many of the consumer and industrial goods which are
critically needed by the developing oil exporting countries.

Indeed, in

many ways, New England has more than its share of this national stock of
these needed goods and services.

At the same time, New England needs to
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import oil or oil products in order to sustain its economic functions.
New England is also in need of new markets for its goods and services.
It is reasonably apparent that there exists an opportunity to create
a relationship between New England and the oil exporting nations which
satisfies the needs of both the oil producers and the oil consumers
better than the current method of exchanging currency for oil.

Two-way

exchanges of resources could very well prove to be better for oil exporters
because some of the short- and long-term economic instabilities triggered
by an over-abundance of cash could be avoided.

The two-way exchange can

be better for New England because the reliability of oil supply could be
increased and because the economy of the region could be benefited.
There are two possible levels of involvement of the region in.the ex
change of goods and services for foreign oil.

The first is to "pay" for

oil with the outputs of New England-based organizations.

The second is

for New England to organize goods and services from many areas of the
country in exchange for the oil.

The best level of involvement is probably

a combination of the producer and brokerage functions.

The following

paragraphs summarize some of the mechanisms which might be used to
initiate this type of program.
A. Establishment of a private "trading company"
PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT

represents a highly sophisticated (not to mention
complex and complicated) development of the industrial
trade missions established by New England.

Public

participation in the establishment of such a company
appears essential on two counts.

First, many producer

countries are growing increasingly suspect and distrustful
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of contracting directly with private companies.
PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT
(continued)

Repre

sentation of the New England states in negotiations
could provide a mediator and brokerage function as
well as offering the kind of confidence desired by
foreign governments in undertaking contract negotiations
with United States companies.

Second, participation

by the New England states would provide them with the
knowledge and confidence needed regarding oil supplies
for the region over the near term in order to vigorously
implement energy policies.

Moreover, public involve

ment could provide for participation in overseas markets
by highly capable smaller New England companies who
otherwise might not have access to such opportunities.
More importantly, public participation could assist and
stimulate the private sector to organize and sell over
seas on a broad and diversified scale that would be
otherwise unattainable.

The resultant economic stimulus

would redound not only to the private sector, but to
the region's residents and state and local governments
as well.

Such an approach also would show the private

sector in and out of New England that the state govern
ments are serious about economically revitalizing the
region.
B. Because the trading company concept is highly sophisti
TASK
FORCE

cated and complex, involving national as well as regional
considerations, a small private and public exploratory
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task force could be convened.
TASK
FORCE
(continued)

among other things:

This task force should,

identify the specific markets in

various producer countries for the goods and services
that could be supplied by New England firms; develop,
on a preliminary basis, feasible and practical organi
zational, legal, and financial arrangements and exchange
procedures; and explore the receptivity to the concept
by New England firms, the State Department, the World
Bank, and key foreign administrators.

Should the task

force report favorably, then full-scale organizing
could proceed.

Even if the overall concept is found

wanting, much of the information assembled should prove
highly useful to many of the region's companies.
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Management of Electric Power
There are currently about 150 electric utilities in New England.
However, almost 70 percent of the total generating capacity is owned by
five systems, four of which are holding companies comprised of several
separate companies.

Over 98 percent of the generating capability of

the region is owned by twelve systems.

Furthermore, all of the major

utilities of New England are physically linked by a regional high voltage
transmission system which, in addition to the interconnections within
the region, is also connected in the west with the major transmission
systems of New York and in the north with Canadian systems.

Thus, New

England's electricity is controlled by a few large companies which, though
organizationally separate, are inextricably inter-linked by transmission
1ines.
Organizational cooperation among most of the region's utilities
occurs through the New England Power Pool (NEP00L).

Formed in 1971, NEP00L

and its operations and planning arms--the New England Power Exchange (NEPEX),
and NEPLAN— provides member utilities with centralized load dispatching and
with the capacity to carry out joint and cooperative planning.

In effect

then,the utilities of New England have the flexibility to act in concert
(through NEP00L) on matters which require common and consistent decisions,
and to act independently on matters which are of concern only to the
individual companies.

Many of the data presented in this section are derived from reports by
Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc. for the Energy Program of the New England
Regional Commission.
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These organizational characteristics, most of which require considerable
analysis in order to appreciate the importance of some of the subtleties,
are critical factors in regional power management.

Until recently,

public sector involvement with the utilities has been limited to the
control and regulatory roles of the state public utility commissions and
environmental agencies, the Federal Power Commission, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.

With expanded involvement through, for example,

increased public authority in facility siting, the public sector is gradually
approaching a position of sharing power management responsibilities with
the utilities.

Therefore, the public sector can no longer afford the

"luxury" of dealing with each utility on an issue-by-issue basis.

Like

the utilities themselves, the public must now address the system consequences
of individual decisions.

The complicated, yet purposeful, organization

of the region's utilities must be understood so that the implementation
of public decisions is not constrained because of insensitivity to the
people and organizations who must, in the end, provide for the electricity
needs of the millions of families, businesses, and institutions in New
England.
This is not meant to suggest that expanded public involvement in power
management is unwarranted.

Current public authorities over rate structures,

facility siting, and environmental quality can, for example, significantly
impact the region's electricity demand profile, the cost of generation and
the price of delivered electricity, the financial capacity of the utilities,
and the regional mix of generating capacity.

Furthermore, increased public

attention to energy conservation, fossil fuel acquisition, and new energy
production technologies can profoundly influence the demand for electricity
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and the fuels available to power plants.

Rather than relying on the

utilities to sort out the systems consequences of this myriad of public
actions, and rather than expecting the utilities to "second guess"
tomorrow's public policy toward energy, it may be better to consider the
possibility that

public agencies, and the utilities should share responsibility

for the future of power generation, transmission, and pricing in New
England.
As stated earlier, the thrust of the program strategy is to minimize
the future cost of electricity and to shift fuel consumption by power
plants away from oil.

The program components--capacity planning, rate

structures/load management, supplemental fuel, conversion to coal, and
nuclear power— fall into two areas of public involvement in power manage
ment.

The first area is directed toward planning functions, and includes

the capacity planning and rate structures/load management components of
the program.

The second area is directed toward the issue of power plant

fuel mix.
Planning - NEPOOL currently projects that New England's generating capacity
will need to be increased to over 35,000 megawatts by 1984 (in 1974,
regional capacity was slightly over 19,500 megawatts).

This represents

almost 16,000 megawatts of capacity additions in ten years.

Of these

additions, all but a little over 5,000 megawatts have either been approved
by NEP00L*s Board of Directors or have been publicly announced.

Over

65 percent of this new capacity is planned to be nuclear.
These capacity additions are justified by NEPOOL on the basis of
forecasts of peak load requirements and necessary reserve margins.

Similar
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forecasts by

nonutility organizations,

however, indicate that the capacity

required for 1985 demands may be as low as 25,000 - 30,000 megawatts,
depending on the success of regional energy conservation programs.

Thus,

whereas NEPOOL's planned reserve margin for the mid-1980's is between
20 and 25 percent, it is possible that the actual margin (if all of the
planned capacity is constructed) could range from 40 to 60 percent; and
just as the region's current 45 percent reserve is costly to New England
consumers, over-expansion of capacity will assure that New Englanders
continue to pay for underutilized plant and equipment.
Events other than energy conservation, a levelling off of per capita
consumption of electricity, and slower than anticipated growth in the
population of the region can reduce generating capacity requirements.
Today, peak demands for electricity are about three times baseload demands.
This situation can be changed by causing electricity demands to be more
equally distributed over the demand period.

Any permanent reduction in

the ratio between peak and base load would be directly reflected in
reduced capacity requirements.
Mitigating against the more conservative projections of electricity
demand are those forces which may lead toward an increase in the per capita
consumption of electricity.

Not to be ignored are the effects which

rapidly escalating prices and the threat of declining supplies of distil
late oil and natural gas could have on future choices for space heating
and (in some cases) for industrial process energy.

If nuclear power does

become the dominant source of electricity in New England, and if the cost
* Including the projections of electricity demand developed by ADL
for NERC0M.
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of nuclear plants and uranium fuel can be kept at levels which result in
reductions in the delivered price of electricity, then it is conceivable
that the demand for electricity could exceed even NEPOOL's projections.
Furthermore, the interest of New England in accelerated industrial
development, and the role which readily available power can plan in fac
ilitating development, can influence attitudes towards needs for
generating capacity.
The purpose here is not to suggest that the demand forecasts of
NEPOOL, or ADL, or any other organization are right or wrong.
not the issue.

That is

It is clear, however, that capacity planning lies at the

heart of the power management problem in New England.

It is also clear

that capacity planning is intimately related to load management, to the
structuring of electricity rates, and to externalities such as public
actions on other energy fronts and the price and supply of energy forms
which are substitutable for electricity (or, more generally, which are
substitutable for electricity from traditional generation and distribution
techniques).

The real issues include:

. How can New England minimize the amount of generating capacity '
required to satisfy its electricity needs?
. What is the optimum use of electricity in New England, i.e., which
uses should be encouraged and which should be discouraged?
. How can consumers be motivated to make efficient use of electricity?
. How can the utilities and the public sector work together to assure
that the importance of these issues is reflected in the scope and
quality of attention by both parties?
Defensible answers to these questions, and responsible actions to
remedy the current problems inherent in planning New England's electricity
future, can protect the region from exaggerated increases in the price of
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The thrust of the program strategy is to accomplish this through a
cooperative public-private planning process.

The paragraphs following,

outline some mechanisms for accomplishing improved capacity planning
and load management.

A.
COOPERATIVE
REGIONWIDE
PLANNING

The region can establish a regional organization that is
authorized by the six New England states to develop with
the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL), and its various sub
organizations and member utilities, a joint public-utility
process for:
- Load forecasting and management;
- New capacity planning;
- Modernization of rate structures;
- Demand reduction.
This organization should not replace the resources of the
various state public utility commissions; it should reinforce
and complement them.

It should be responsible for assuring

that the states and the utilities move cooperatively toward
a balanced system of power plants that produce sufficient
electricity to meet New England's needs at the lowest possible
cost to the consumer.

This organization should also be respon

sible for recommending how the impacts of electric power
generation can be shared equitable within the region and
among consuming sectors.

Of particular importance are that:

(a) agreement be reached soon on the most appropriate basis
for determining, and planning for, new capacity require
ments through 1990; and (b) rate structures be designed
which could encourage a reduction in peak loads.
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POWER PLANT
SITING

B. The states can adopt measures, individually or collectively, that will assure expeditious review, including adequate
public participation, and approval of applications
for the location and construction of power plants.
Current review and approval procedures should be
streamlined so that the time required for their
completion be minimized.

Past delays in site

approvals should be analyzed to determine why the
delays occurred and to define methods which could
prevent recurring faults in the siting process.*

C. The region and its states should determine whether
NUCLEAR
PERFORMANCE
GOALS

it is feasible, and whether it would be effective,
to define a very specific set of performance ex
pectations for nuclear power plants— including:
plant reliability and safety; security of fuel
supply, transportation, and storage; adequacy of
radioactive waste disposal; and protection of the
environment and public health from the risks of
operating failures or anomalies.

At the very least,

these performance goals would express the expectations
of the region's public leadership and responsible
interest groups regarding nuclear power generation.

* A Federal Regional Council task force, led by FEA, has been addressing
this problem.
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Fuel Mix - In 1974, approximately 70 percent of the input energy to New
England's electric utilities was from residual oil.

This represents

about 90 percent of the fossil fuels used by the utilities, compared to
the national average of about 20 percent.

The heavy reliance of New

England on residual oil for power plants has resulted in extremely high
prices for electricity since the embargo of 1973-74.

Boston consumers,

for example, saw their electricity costs per killowatt-hour increase by
over 55 percent in the two-year period ending in the summer of 1974.
The reasons for electric utilities to move toward a more balanced
fuel mix are numerous. Residual oil is likely to continue for some time
to be the most expensive of the fossil fuels.

And because most of New

England's residual oil comes from foreign sources, its supply security
is uncertain.

Thus, a switch away from oil may have beneficial price

effects and may decrease the region's vulnerability to the risks of
capricious actions by oil sources.

Furthermore, a more diverse fuel mix

would provide more flexibility to pick up the slack should one fuel become
scarce, or to balance capacity utilization on the basis of cost to operate.
The alternatives for changing the power plant fuel mix are also
numerous.

In the near- to mid-term, the actions which will have the most

significant impact are those which cause a shift from oil to coal and
nuclear power.

Unfortunately, both of these shifts are fraught with

problems which are very difficult to deal with.
The shift to coal can occur in two ways:

conversion of existing oil-

fired facilities; and design of all new fossil fuel plants to burn coal
instead of oil.

In early 1974, it was estimated* that approximately 2500

These estimates are derived from the report by Ernst & Ernst to the Energy
Program of the New England Regional Commission entitled "Feasibility of
Short-Term Switching of Utilities from Burning Coal & Oil" (February 1974).
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megawatts of power generating capacity could be converted from oil to coal
burning.

This was 1n addition to the 342 megawatts which had already

been converted In late 1973.

These actual and potential conversions

were estimated to save over 28 million barrels of residual oil annually,
or about one third of the oil consumption by utilities In 1974.
The Implementation of these conversions to coal 1s not easily accom
plished; nor Is It without cost.
are those associated with:

The most difficult problems to overcome

(a) securing a long-term supply of low sulfur

coal at a reasonable price; and (b) transporting the coal to New England's
utilities.

The most significant cost to the region of conversion to coal

1s the resultant Impact on air quality*

Of the conversions noted above,

only ten percent or so will not result In some deterioration 1n air quality.
Over 65 percent of the conversions could cause serious air pollution
problems.

However, even 1f the conversions which might cause serious

deterioration 1n air quality are eliminated as possibilities, the savings
1n residual oil would still be in excess of ten percent of the region's
1974 consumption by power plants.
Between now and 1990, generating capacity In New England could exceed
35,000 megawatts.

NEPOOL's plan would result In additions of about 2,500 megawatts

of fossil fuel-fired capacity, and over 10,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity.
If all of the new fossil fuel-fired capacity planned by NEPOOL were
designed to b u m coal rather than residual oil, the resultant 1990 balance
between residual oil and coal for conventional thermal power plants would
be approximately 80 percent oil and 20 percent coal.

#

If environmentally

Conservation and load management measures could reduce this requirement
to somewhere around 30,000 megawatts.
The 1974 balance was about 94 percent oil and 6 percent coal.

acceptable conversions of existing facilities are included, the percentages
change

to between 25 and 30 percent coal, and 70 to 75 percent oil.

This

level of coal consumption by New England's electric utilities would
require over 10 million tons of coal per year, or roughly the same amount
which came into the region in 1966.
The problems associated with the construction of this level of new
coal-fired plants are similar to those which conversion programs are up
against, i.e. acquisition of adequate coal supplies, transportation system
inadequacies, and environmental consequences.

The major difference is

that the larger scale of coal-based operations means that many of the
problems reach a level which makes them very difficult to handle.

For

example, whereas the utilities might be able to dispose of the bottom ash
from the converted facilities in existing disposal areas, the incremental
amounts of solid waste from the new facilities will require the acquisition
of large tracts of land for the considerable additional ash and (possibly)
sludges.
The other large scale alternative for balancing the power plant fuel
mix is to continue to add nuclear plants at a faster rate than fossil
plants.

The arguments over nuclear power are well-known and will not be

repeated here.

The question which must be answered by New England 1s

whether in the long term the risks of nuclear power generation are any
*

more or less significant than the risks of relying on coal or on oil.
* It is the opinion of the authors that this question has yet to be answered
in a manner which makes it possible for public leaders to choose a course
of action with confidence that it Is in the best interest of the region
and other region's of the country. Furthermore, it does appear that these
traditional options may each be unacceptable. This is one of the reasons
for the main thrust of the overall program strategy, i.e. to use conserva
tion as a method to minimize the necessity to choose from unacceptable
alternatives.

It is undeniable that the region's current course toward nuclear
power will cause a considerable shift in the power plant fuel mix.

By

1990, for example, the addition of about 10,000 megawatts of nuclear
capacity would mean that about 40 percent of the region's capacity will
be nuclear.

In conjunction with a switch of fossil fuel plants to coal,

the resultant distribution of power plant generating capacity could be:
. Nuclear
.Oil

............. 40 percent (approximate)
......... 30 percent (approximate)

. Coal ................. 10 percent (approximate)
. Other* ............... 20 percent (approximate)
Also in the near- to mid-term is the opportunity to take advantage of
New England's renewable resources for fuel supplements or for powering
small-scale electricity generators.

These opportunities are very attractive,

but combined they do not offer anywhere near a baseload solution.

They

do, however, get New England started on a course which could have signifi
cant long-term payoffs.
With commitments made now, in the long term New England could have the
opportunity to derive most of its electricity from renewable resources.
To harness on a large scale the various forms of solar energy for electricity
production within the next twenty-five years or so, however, requires that
investments in appropriate technologies be accelerated from the current
rate to one which better reflects the potential payoffs to New England and
to the United States as a whole.
★

Other types of generating capacity include gas turbine, combined cycle,
diesel, hydroelectric, pumped storage, and fuel cells.
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The most promising near-term opportunities are the utilization of
solid waste as a source of boiler fuel, and the use of windmills for smallscale electricity generation.

The use of refuse-derived fuel in utility

boilers was first proven on a full-scale basis by Union Electric in St.
Louis.

Since then, other innovators have committed themselves to projects

which are riskier than the St. Louis system (in which the refuse is used
as a supplement to coal).

The Bridgeport (Connecticut) project, for

example, involves supplementing oil in the boilers of one of United
Illuminating's plants.
As mentioned earlier, capture of the combustible fraction of the
solid waste from New England's large metropolitan areas could result in
a replacement of over 5 percent of the oil and coal which would otherwise
be consumed by electric utilities.

The region's utilities, however, are

not in business to dispose of solid waste.

They will need a reliable and

consistent supply of refuse-derived fuel, and they will not be willing to
jeopardize their operations should the fuel cause boiler problems.

In

addition, the utilities will most likely require that any of the incremental
capital or operating costs caused by their use of the supplemental fuel s
be paid for by the fuel supplier.
The use of windmills for small-scale generation of electricity is an
example of an application of both new and old technologies in which one
of the major unknowns is whether or not the utilities will help to deter
mine the best way to interface the on-site system with their centralized
systems.

Although no reliable estimates of the supply potential from

windmills exist, favorable wind conditions in New England and a growing
technological capability to capture the wind energy point toward a rapidly
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evolving alternative to total dependence on a centralized system of power
generation.

Even some of the utilities appear to see possible marketing

opportunities in small-scale systems.
The mechanisms which follow can be used to help the region strike a
power plant fuel mix which is less oriented toward oil and which provides
for a more manageable system of power generation.
A. New England must address the issue of the desired
OIL/COAL/NUCLEAR
BALANCE

near- to mid-term power plant fuel mix.

The utilities

have made clear statements as to their intentions; the
public debate has been confusing and often loaded with contra
dictory statements.

The region should define in as consistent

and comprehensive manner as possible, the benefits,
costs, and risks associated with large-scale oil,
coal and nuclear power plants.

These determinations

could then be subjected to intensive public review
and scrutiny so that judgmental values can be
incorporated in the review, and so that the broadest
possible base of technical expertise is brought to
bear on the problem.

The final results of this

effort might then be the basis for a fuel mix plan
which is arrived at through a regionwide

negotiation

between the public sector and the utilities.

B. The significant potential of refuse-derived fuel for
SUPPLEMENTAL
FUEL FROM
SOLID WASTE

supplementing oil or coal should be realized at the
earliest possible date.

The utilities will not
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subvert their responsibility to deliver electricity
SUPPLEMENTAL
FUEL FROM
SOLID WASTE
(continued)

at low cost and with maximum reliability— and the
burning of refuse-derived fuel could increase generating
60 sts or even cause significant boiler maintenance

problems.

One method for relieving the fuel suppliers

(who frequently will be municipalities or statesponsored authorities) from their liabilities for
increased utility operating costs and even worse,
from the risk that a utility might be forced by a
PUC to discontinue use of the fuel due to increases
in costs which cannot be transferred to the supplier,
is to establish a liability trust fund which can
act as insurance against such occurrences.

The

fund would be built from insurance premiums paid
by the fuel suppliers (the premiums would have to be
reasonable; the insurance period would have to be
at least as long as the period required to retire
the capital financing

obligations of the supplier).

In return for protection against incremental
operating costs,

the utilities could be required

to sign a long-term commitment to purchase the fuel
on a price per Btu equivalency with their primary
fuel.
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C. As part of an effort to encourage the utilization
SMALL-SCALE
GENERATING
SYSTEMS

of small-scale on-site electricity generating systems
that use renewable sources of energy, the states and
the region can work with the utilities to devise
methods that make it possible for a utility to enter
into buy-sell agreements with owners of the smallscale systems.

This will cause a more efficient use

of the decentralized systems and could, over time,
lead to a reduced need for new centralized generating
capacity.

D. New England should bring pressure on the federal govern
ment, and particularly on the Energy Research and Develop
ment Administration, to rationalize electric power-related
:d eral

energy R&D expenditures so that investments in new tech
nologies reflect at least six criteria:

(a) the likely

supply potential of the technology; (b) the likely timing
of the commercialization of the technology; (c) the fuel(s)
that the resultant technology will replace and their
expected future availability, price, etc.; (d) the social
and environmental costs of the technology; (e) the econ
omic impacts from commercialization of the technology;
and (f) the net energy produced by the technology, i.e.,
net of extraction and conversion efficiencies, trans
mission losses, and energy subsidies for the extraction
distribution cycle.

Developed in this multi-dimensional

return on investment format, ERDA's investment profile
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would reflect a sensitivity of R&D to a broad range
FEDERAL
ggn

of needs.

(continued)

expand the importance of the unique needs and capabilities

In addition, ERDA should be encouraged to

of the regions to its resource allocation decisions.
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Energy Industry Development*
Energy, in much the same manner as other forms of infrastructure
such as highways and sewer lines, is an input requirement, and deter
minant of the development pattern, of the New England economy.
energy is the life blood of any developed economy.

Indeed,

Thus, it is appro

priate that the public sector guard the security of its energy supply
and attempt to assure equitable energy costs.

However, public energy

programs also can be viewed as means for expanding private market oppor
tunities, creating new enterprises, and providing job opportunities.
Energy is a manufactured product— the output of a number of different
industries engaged in the chain from extraction of raw fuel sources
(e.g., crude oil) through distribution.

Industries involved in fuel ex

traction and processing and in the production and distribution of usable
energy are key to the economic development of the nation.

These "energy"

industries are important economic activities, per se, because:
. They provide jobs and income directly and indirectly through
multiplier effects; and
. They have stimulated the development and growth of support
industries (such as manufacturers of refinery and process con
trol equipment), and derivative industries (such as plastics
manufacturers).
Thus, from the primary energy industries have developed complexes of
interrelated industries along the chain of extraction, processing, pro
duction, and distribution of energy.

*

This section is both based on, and contains paraphrases from, the
Development Sciences Inc. report to the Energy Program of the New
England Regional Conmission entitled "Decision Making for Energy
Facilities in New England" (December 1975).
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New England, lacking its own indigenous fossil fuel sources, has
had a relatively small participation in the economic stimulus provided
by the nation's development of traditional fossil fuels.

It does some

manufacturing of heavy turbines, process control systems, and--more
recently--the construction of sophisticated and specialized LNG tanker^.
It is also the location of important engineering services for the design
and construction of refineries around the world.

However, the region

has not experienced the agglomeration of industrial complexes related to
energy development which has occurred in energy resource-rich areas.
Even with OCS development and construction of a refinery or refineries
In New England, it is unlikely that the manufacture of the sophisticated
and specialized equipment components will take place here.
Despite all of this, New England should not dismiss the economic
development potential provided by energy industries.

Today, concern over

dependency upon traditional fossil fuels is beginning to stimulate the
development and growth of new energy industry complexes.

These complexes

will be based upon renewable energy resources, especially the many forms
of solar energy, and upon recapturing energy embodied in discarded pro
ducts of society— trash (solid waste), and wastes from various industrial
processes.

Development and growth of new energy industrial complexes

involving new technologies and fuel sources provides New England with an
opportunity to build a foundation for renewing a once flourishing economy.
Involvement in the final stages of development of the domestic oil and
gas industries gives che region entry into the energy market, and focuses
energy industry attention on New England.
Only with the energy crisis created by OPEC actions has New England
begun to become aware of the economic opportunities associated with energy
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developments.

This has led toward a justifiable interest in the more

glamorous new energy industries associated with renewable supplies and
recovery from waste products and waste heat.

While opportunities exist

for New England to capture its "fair share" of the growth of the new
energy industrial complex, it is in stiff competition with the energy
rich producing states who already are jointly mobilizing to use their
energy resources to further their economic development by further shaping
national policy to their benefit.
The rewards may be substantial.

Recent estimates indicate that by

1985 solar heating and cooling systems will be a $1.3 billion annual
market in the United States with an even greater potential during the
last fifteen years of this century.

Solar energy for the production of

electricity, while further off than individual building heating and cooling
systems, will start to become a burgeoning market during the latter part
of this century.

Related alternative energy technologies, such as wind

mills, for electric power generation will also begin to come on-line
during the next ten- to twenty-year period.

NASA, for example, is building

a windmill power plant in Sandusky, Ohio, and there is a proposal to build
a 70 megawatt windmill generator on Cape Cod.

Technologies for utilizing

tidal change and thermal gradients may also become commercialized in the
not too distant future.
Federal legislation promoting private demonstrations in alternative
energy technologies and joint public-private ventures will contribute to
the development and commercialization of alternative energy technologies.
New England can capitalize on the economic development potential offered
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by the rapid growth of alternative energy technology, just as it did in
the late 40's, 50's, and the early 60's in the electronic and computer
fields.
Development, production, and servicing of alternative energy tech
nologies could provide New England-based firms with a competitive edge
in "Third World" trade.

Many of these oil rich developing countries

over the next 30 - 50 years will see their energy resources depleted.

,

To conserve this resource for the highest and best uses, such as fer
tilizer production, they increasingly will need to turn to the use of
alternative energy technologies to meet their internal energy require
ments.

Iran's recent efforts to obtain a large nuclear generating plant

as part of a trade package with the United States is a foretaste of the
international market for alternative energy technologies which can be
expected to emerge.

Alternative energy technologies may also be helpful

in these countries' efforts to check the frightful and overwhelming
growth of a few metropolises, and in achieving the objectives of their
economic development plans.

Gaining a competitive edge in alternative

energy technologies,'thus, could open additional market opportunities
for New England's "brain power" based economy.
If New England fails to move aggressively and rapidly into the
alternative energy technology field, it may remain in the economic
doldrums while other regions prosper from the national drive toward a
restructuring of our energy production capabilities.

The impact of this

rapidly expanding field will not only be in manufacturing, but in the
development of associated distribution and service systems and from
construction activities associated with putting the alternative tech-
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oologies in place.

Public actions which can accelerate utilization of

alternative energy technologies in New England can:
- Provide a partial replacement for the declining momentum
being experienced in communications equipment, electronic
components, computers and other business equipment; and
- Provide some off-set to the market uncertainties facing
the region's aerospace and shipbuilding industries.
The requirements for an effective New England energy industry de
velopment program should Include capabilities to
- Create market opportunities for New England-based companies;
- Stimulate private capital investment in New England in new
energy production facilities; and
- Stimulate the formation of new energy enterprises.
The central objective is to significantly increase opportunities for
employment of New Englanders already in the labor force, or those young
persons who will begin entering the labor force over the next fifteen
years.

The strategy is to provide development incentives which are

sufficient for giving New England an "edge" in its attractiveness to
promising new businesses, or to established companies which are expansionminded.

And, although the focus is on that segment of the energy industry

which is still in its infancy, the program is intended to cover all forms
of energy industry development.
As mentioned earlier, there are two major program components for
energy industry development in New England.

These program components

involve public actions of:
- Direct public investments
- Incentives for energy industry development.
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In general, actions involving direct public investment have the objectives
of fostering the creation of new enterprises in the energy technology
field and of stimulating private investments in energy technology.

The

objective of actions associated with providing incentives for development
is primarily to stimulate the formation of a large-scale New England based
market for new energy technologies, and to create an investment environ
ment which attracts capital into the region for large-scale energy facilitites.

Combinations of the program components are necessary if there is

to be a significant contribution made to the job and energy needs of the
region.
Direct Public Investment - Direct public investment primarily is a device
to stimulate development and commercialization of a variety of alternative
energy technologies.

Such an approach accomplishes two objectives:

acceleration of a switch from traditional oil consuming technologies
(or from traditional sources of oil), hence a reduction in the region's
dependence exclusively upon imported oil; and expansion in plant, equip
ment, and employment as a result of private investment multiplier effects.
Several different types of actions by the states could be undertaken
to encourage private investment into alternative energy technologies.
Such actions can range from joint venture corporations to site acquisi
tion for an energy facility and related uses, to financial rewards to
inventors, to underwriting pilot or full-scale demonstration projects,
and to provision of venture capital to new enterprises.
Examples of what can be done by the public sector are outlined below.
These examples generally fall into two categories:

(1) direct stimulation

of private investment; and (2) formation of new enterprises in alternative
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energy technologies.

Public underwriting of new enterprise formation

presumes an increase in private investment as such enterprises begin
to grow.
A. The states individually or collectively could
JOINT VENTURE
CORPORATIONS

follow the lead established by federal statue
(Sec. 7[b] of PL 93-577, Non-nuclear Energy Re
search and Development Act of 1974) and establish
joint state (regional) industry corporations.
Such corporations should specify the time interval
of state participation— probably not less than 10
years and not more than 15 years.

Each such cor

poration should be able to design, construct,
operate and maintain one or more experimental,
demonstration or commercial size facility in order
to determine the technical, environmental, financial
and market feasibility of a particular energy tech
nology.

Industry participants would be New England

based firms.

The extent of state financial partici

pation should be determined in advance of the actual
formation of a corporation.

Criteria used to determine

the extent of public participation might include:
- Technical and economic risk of the venture;
- Probability of a financial return to the venture which
would permit reimbursement to the state to cover its
principal and any interest costs incurred;
- Probability of financial return to private sector
participants;
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- Financing capability of the potential private
participants;
JOINT VENTURE
CORPORATIONS
(continued)

- Potential of the corporation's activities re
sulting in substantial market and growth prospects
beyond the time established for the duration of
the joint venture corporation.
In agreeing to pubiic participation in such joint
ventures, it would be important that the state (reW
gion) not confine itself only to those situations
where it could reasonably expect a payback of its
investment.

An important function of such joint

ventures is to stimulate the New England private
sector to undertake investments in high-risk areas
of energy technology that may have a long-term
promise of significant payoffs.

The underlying

premise is that through such joint ventures, the
private sector would gain more quickly competitive
capability in a wide range of energy technologies
than if it had to rely solely on conventional means
of financing.

Moreover, this capability could be

spread among both small and large firms (which is
unlikely in the absence of public assistance).
Public financial participation could be achieved
through one of several different devices, depending
upon the overall purpose of the corporation and the
revenues expected:
- appropriation out of general revenues;
- issuance of industrial revenue bonds;
- levying of a very small energy research and develop
ment tax on various categories of fossil fuel consumers.

103

B. Energy facility site acquisition can expedite private
SITE ACQUISITION
FOR
ENERGY FACILITIES

investments by guaranteeing that needed sites will be
available to private energy facility developers at
reasonable costs when needed.

Appropriately located

and environmentally acceptable sites could be acquired
for such energy facilities as power plants» refineries»
shoreside terminals, manufacturing plants, wind power
generating plants, etc.

Depending upon the particular

energy facility and arrangements made with private
Industry, public acquisition of sites could include
land for industrial parks or large-scale commercial
or residential developments.
In order to develop an energy facility site acquisition
program, it may be desirable that a revolving land
acquisition fund be established.

The states could

create a special authority or public corporation
responsible for the management of such a fund, or
could assign the function to an existing agency.

Be

cause of the potential for Unking other types of de
velopment such as an industrial park or large-scale
residential complex to energy facility sites, con
sideration should be given to creating a statewide
organization, perhaps patterned somewhat along the
lines of the Nashville Thermal Transfer Corporation in
Tennessee, for supplying heating and cooling services
from steam.
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C. In order to encourage developments 1n alternative
FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES
TO
INVENTORS

energy technologies that would have widespread
commercial application, the states could provide
financial incentives in the form of grants or
financial rewards to inventors or to a consortium
of inventors.

The term "inventors" could include

an individual, a corporation, a university and
other nonprofit entities.

An important issue associ

ated with such a financial incentive program would
be the need to resolve patent rights 1n an equitable
manner.

If patents are to be only in the name of the

state providing a grant, there is a potential danger
that inventors would not make use of such a financial
program for fear of losing substantial future income
from royalties.

D. A demonstration program can accelerate the development
UNDERWRITING
DEMONSTRATION
PROJECTS

and commercialization of energy technologies developed
by New England-based firms.

Pilot or full-scale dem

onstration projects are often required to prove the
technical and economic feasibility of a particular
technology.

Such demonstration projects also provide

an invaluable marketing device by permitting the manu
facturer to show prospective purchasers a "hands on"
demonstration that the equipment (system) actually
works.

Financial encouragement of such demonstrations
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could make the New England states a "product con
UNDERWRITING
DEMONSTRATION
PROJECTS
(conti nued)

vention center" for the working display of its
industries, products and capabilities.
Underwriting of pilot or full-scale demonstrations
should be restricted to those situations where internal
corporate funds are not sufficient to support such an
activity, or where outside conventional sources of
funds are not readily available.

It can be expected

that small and medium sized energy technology firms
are most likely to be in need of such state demonstra
tion grants.
Demonstration grants need not cover the full cost of
design, engineering, and construction.

Instead, grant

assistance might be for planning, market research, or
preliminary engi neering.

E. Some of the New England states as part of their tech
FORMATION OF
NEW ENERGY
ENTERPRISES

nical assistance programs try to assist new entrepreneurs
in securing venture capital through conventional sources.
It might be desirable, however, to enlarge such activities
by having available a state venture capital fund to
finance high risk new energy enterprises.

Such finan

cing should not compete with more conventional sources
of private financing.

Rather, it should be made avail

able only where private financing is not available at
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FORMATION OF
NEW ENERGY
ENTERPRISES
(continued)

reasonable interest charges or terms and conditions.
Alternatives to direct venture capital should also be
considered, including loans, loan guarantees, and risk
insurance.
Management of such a state venture capital fund will
require special expertise in assessing the entrepre
neurial drive of the applicant, the management and
marketing know-how of the persons involved, the sales
potential of the product, and various technical factors
associated with the proposed product.

In addition,

there should be a follow-on management assistance
program aimed at minimizing the mistakes often made
by new enterprises during the first two years of
operation.

The expertise required to manage this kind

of program can be in-house, but in order to obtain some
of the highly specialized skills needed, considerations
should be given to contracting with private organizations
in New England who already have such capability.

Incentives for Development - Industrial development can be stimulated
through methods which are less direct than public investment in risky
ventures.

One advantage of indirect methods such as tax incentives is

that there is less chance that public intervention 1n private industry
activities will lead toward complex private-public relationships which
are difficult for both parties to manage consistently.

A disadvantage

of these less direct methods is that market response to them may develop
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slowly, and as a result certain opportunities may be lost.
The mechanisms listed below might be used as part of the program to
cause energy industry development to occur in New England at a more
rapid pace than might otherwise be expected.
A. Frequently, one of the constraining factors to
various forms of energy industry development is the
SITE

PRE-DESIGNATION

process of acquiring a site and receiving necessary
approvals for its development.

Short of site acqui

sition, the states could designate certain areas
which they deem suitable for specific types of energy
facility development.

The designation of suitability

for specific forms of development could carry with it
a streamlined process for state approval of the site
once various permits are applied for.

This does not

mean that strict enforcement of state or local en
vironmental or land-use controls should be foregone—
the pre-designation process should be designed so as
to avoid the misuse of land and other resources and
to make the site approval process more a function of
the quality of the design of the specific project
than a decision on the ability of the site and its
environs to carry the development.

B. Sometimes, tax laws can be the difference between a "go"
TAX
INCENTIVES

and "no go" decision on an investment.

Sometimes, the

promise of a tax break can swing the decision toward

108

TAX
INCENTIVES
(continued)

the investment.

Otherwise, the threat of a (relative)

tax penalty can prevent the investment.
can use tax incentives to:

The states

(a) encourage businesses

to locate in New England; (b) encourage New England
residents to invest in local businesses; (c) encourage
households and businesses to upgrade heating systems,
to invest in supplementary fuel Systems, or to improve
their energy use practices; and (d) encourage New
England businesses to invest in energy-related research
and development.

Tax credits, accelerated depreciation

allowances, and delayed taxation are all mechanisms
which can be used to provide incentives to citizens
and businesses to act in concert with the general
public purpose.

C. The public sector can create favorable market conditions
MARKET
AGGL0MERATI0N

for the widespread commercialization of new energy technologies.

For example, statewide building codes could

be adopted requiring that certain new residential or
commercial structures have solar water heating.
a requirement is mandatory in Australia.)

(Such

At a

mimimum, building codes (and, in some states, historic
district building legislation) should permit use of
solar and wind technologies.
The states could require that all new public buildings
and buildings receiving state financial assistance
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MARKET
AGGLOMERATION
(continued)

install heating and cooling systems that use either
solar technology or solid waste as a fuel source.

A

similar requirement could be made where there is a
major modernization of an existing public building.
The states could modify existing regulations and rate
structures to encourage electric utilities to use wind
technology and recovered fuel from solid wastes.

Con

sideration also could be given to permitting utilities
to utilize surplus electric power generated by non
utility sources.

This consideration is complicated

because of its effect on the rate structure, but
should not be dismissed for that reason.

Indeed, there

are already instances where individuals using wind to
produce their own electric energy needs are contribu
ting their surplus production to a local utility
system.

D. Technical assistance can run the gamut from promotion
TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE

of the use of new energy technologies and installation
of insulation and storm windows to assistance to
companies regarding improved methods of industrial
processing including use of recovered fuel to site
pre-designation for power plants, refineries, shoreside
terminals, etc. to streamlined procedures for the pro
cessing of applications for energy facility siting.
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TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE
(continued)

The states can provide these various forms of
technical assistance and thereby help achieve an
economic environment which supports rather than
opposes the efforts of industry to achieve its
purpose.

Ill

INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY

Public sector Involvement in New England energy management has
developed rapidly over the last few years.

Each of the six states

now has the foundation for a reasonably comprehensive capability to
deal with the types of issues and challenges which have been raised
by the foregoing program strategy.

Each foundation is different--

reflecting a collage of needs and values, of problems and organiza
tional styles, and of philosophies and drives which makes each state
unique and yet viewed as a whole presents a picture in which dissonance
improves quality.

Each foundation can be improved, especially in order

to assure that the many complex and interrelated challenges of system
atic management of energy supply and demand are not lost because of
interagency misinterpretations of roles and missions.*

The key

problem, however, is not with the individual states.
Many, 1f not most, of the region's energy problems are either
multi-state in nature or are better dealt with by six states acting in
concert rather than alone.

The institutional problem in New England

is that there does not exist a regional entity which has a long-term
charge to address these many regional aspects of the energy problems of
the several states.

That the Energy Program of the New England Regional

Commission has been so useful to the region and to each of the individual
energy offices indicates that the need for a regional organization is
both real and immediate.

* The report by Development Sciences Inc. to the Energy Program of the
New England Regional Commission entitled New England Energy Resource
Management: Perspectives for Change develops a detailed analysis of
some of the energy-related decision processes for each of the six states.
The report also recommends energy management functions which each state
should be able to perform.
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The program strategy which has been recommended suggests that
many functions could be performed at the regional level, and that
those which should be performed at the state level are coordinated
among the states and supported by an organization which can provide
certain information and services more efficiently than can the
individual states.

If New England is to take up the challenge of

shaping its energy future, then it must also put Into place the most
effective institutional means for doing so.

The time to foster energy

regionalism is before New England once again gets forced piecemeal
into

a reaction rather than action mode.

And that time is at hand.

A Regional Energy Council*
It is recommended that the six states acting collectively authorize
the formation of a regional energy management organization called, for
now, the Regional Energy Council.
as an advisory body.

The Council should serve initially

Prior to its creation, however, a specific agree

ment should be reached, and a conmitment made, to broaden the scope and
authority of the Council through a formal regionwide compact which pro
vides the Council with certain powers to act on behalf of the six states.
These powers might include, for example, the authority to represent the
states in those aspects of electric power management in which NEPOOL becomes
involved.

The Regional Energy Council would serve as an interstate

clearing house and coordinator for energy resource management and
facility siting.

*

It would perform several key functions to supplement

This discussion is both based on, and paraphrases, parts of the above
noted report by Development Sciences Inc.
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the management efforts of the various state energy agencies, including:
- Determination of regional power needs, e.g.:
. Load forecasts
. Capacity needs
. Demand reduction
. Rate structure changes
-

Development of regional energy balance and fuel mix targets

- Development of energy use standards
-

Delivery of energy research and development services

-

Representation of the states' positions with agencies of the
federal government and with private industry

-

Resolution of energy-related conflicts among the states; and
encouragement of joint solutions to common or related energy
problems

-

Delivery of technical assistance to New England organizations

- Liaison with other regional and international organizations,
especially the New England Regional Commission, the New England
River Basins Commission and the Canadian Provinces.
The Regional Energy Council membership could include one designated
member from each state energy agency or a governor appointee with the
overall intention of maintaining a multi-interest body.

The Council

could meet regularly and on an ad-hoc basis, depending on need.
Briefly, it could address its functional responsibilities as
follows.

Direct and on-going communications with NEPOOL would be

fostered in the area of power forecasts and facility needs.

NEPOOL

information would be integrated with information contributed by each
state member.

The compilation and coordination of state level energy

balance and fuel mix information would provide the Council with a re
gional basis for advising the individual states on energy resource

114

management needs.

State level energy use standards— space heating and

cooling, building construction and lighting standards, load leveling
techniques, etc., could be brought before the Council for evaluation
in terms of regional compatibility.

Appropriate recommendations for

change would then be made to the states.

The Council arrangement also

provides a unique opportunity for the membership to exchange information
on research and development proposals from the various states and, in
conjunction with the governors and the regional agencies

(NERCOM and

NERBC), the Council could develop priorities for funding proposals
related to new energy producing technologies for state and/or regional
application (e.g., solar heating systems, windmill power generators, etc.).
The Council could also provide a base for region-wide support of energy
related R&D at the federal level.
The Regional Energy Council could serve as New England's Regional
Task Force for evaluating the problems of onshore and offshore impacts
of OCS development and for proposing solutions (see the conclusions of
Chapter Two).

The Council's multi-interest membership and supporting

staff could work in concert with the two major regional agencies as
well as with the individual state coastal zone management programs to
contribute regional inputs as part of the Department of Interior's
management program for this natural resource.
could include:

Task Force responsibilities

the coordination of onshore environmental impact state

ment requirements; advice to the states on the siting of petroleum
facilities; and advice to DOI on equitable lease staging procedures in
light of national policy, expected volumes, onshore impacts, fisheries
and other competing uses— so that tract development can have the least
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environmental impact on the individual states and the region.

Further

more, the Task Force could evaluate the precedent set by the Deepwater
Port Act of 1974 concerning state level veto power over facilities in
national waters.
To supplement the functions of the Regional Energy Council,
especially in the area of advising on energy facility siting, it is
proposed that the Council initiate the development of a regional Tech
nical Advisory Board (TAB) to serve a major subordinate arm of the
Counci 1.
The work of a regional board such as TAB could contribute to state
related facility siting decisions; technical credibility would be gained
by the Regional Energy Council as well.

The TAB would draw upon the

regional Council's information base as well as other sources to:
- Centralize and coordinate natural resource, social,
economic and energy resource technical data of regional
concern and provide technical staff to service state
needs.
- Provide a rational and unbiased expert panel to review and
evaluate energy facility site development proposals.
- Foster regional agreement on the suitability of proposals
to provide credibility for state-level decisions.
- Minimize conflicts and reduce the possibility of court cases
through an adequately publicized open decision process.
- Provide a forum for the unified representation of New England
concerns on OCS development as well as an institutional body
capable of evaluating the positive and negative consequences
to the region of onshore OCS related support and production
facilities.
- Support the efforts of the state public utility commissions.
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With the formation of NEPOOL, the electric power generation
utilities have set a precedent, though limited, at the New England
regional level concerning communications and coordination with respect
to power plant needs and siting.
NEPOOL organization.

Only utility members comprise the

The proposed TAB would include members with ex

pertise in all major types of energy facilities (not only power plants)
and with access to the kind of data required to evaluate the suitability
of facilities.
The ingredients required to implement a TAB capable of providing
the service functions listed above, and others, are currently available
in the region— a large reservoir of technical people exists in the
academic, business, and government sectors, and an appropriate reservoir
of natural resource and social, economic and energy resource technical
data is available at various agency levels.

These reservoirs of people

and information could be drawn upon to develop the TAB organization.
Several federal, regional, and state institutions could contribute data
in support of a proposed TAB effort.
In light of the potential positive and negative impacts and overall
complexity of energy facility siting, the TAB should be characterized by
an interdisciplinary membership capable of providing a credible and
balanced perspective to the evaluation of facility siting proposals
brought before it.

It is suggested that the membership include repre

sentation from the following disciplines:

land use and urban development,

environmental conservation and protection, water pollution control, air
pollution control, manufacturing, engineering, electric power industry,
gas industry, and the petroleum industry.

An initial eight-member panel

is suggested with each New England state governor afforded one appointment
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and one at-large appointment afforded to each of the major regional
agencies--NERBC and NERCOM.

A chairman should be selected by vote

of the whole membership.

Administration of the Regional Energy Council
The Regional Energy Council membership should advertise for and
select an appropriate executive director responsible for managing dayto-day activities of the Council and the TAB.

The executive director

would, in turn, be responsible for selecting an adequate staff to support
overall Council activities.

A staffing arrangement could involve the

selection of a northern states technical director, southern states
technical director, one specialist representing each of the six states,
and some number of technical support staff members.

Maximum use of ex

isting state and/or regional personnel should be fostered and funded
by the Council's budget, but these people would be on loan from other
agencies to service Council needs.

At least one staff member should be

an attorney familiar with energy facility siting regulatory requirements
and the social and economic issues implicit to facility siting.
For the present, it is recommended that the governors assign an
existing regional body, such as the New England Regional Commission, as
acting Regional Energy Council for a specified period of time.

Each

governor should appoint one representative (responsible for state energy
policies/programs) to work with the Conmission during this interim period.
At the end of the period, the Commission and appointees should present
to the governors a detailed plan for forming the Council and for imple
menting functions described herein. The plan should also include proposed
legislative packages.
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Several funding options could be pursued in support of the organi
zational, operational and research activities of the Regional Energy
Council.

One option is that each state could levy a Btu tax or energy

surtax assessment.

Allotments prorated according to population could

be made to the Council by each state, or a prorated formula could be
based upon individual states' Btu or surtax assessments.

To offset TAB

administrative costs, a prescribed percent of a state's facility permit
filing fee could be allocated.

Another option could involve an equal

yearly assessment against each New England state.
Supplemental financial and legislative support is conceivable through
the auspices of several existing and pending federal grant programs.

The

Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), pursuant to the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (PL93-438) is authorized to initiate
and maintain new energy research and development programs at federal and/
or non-federal levels and could serve as a funding source for
Council activities.

Several bills are currently under Congressional con

sideration which would provide substantial financial and legislative
support for both state and regional energy-resource management policies
and programs.

Several important sections are quoted in part below to

provide a perspective on the intent of these proposed legislative packages
. Outer Continental Shelf Management Act of 1975 (S.521); Regional
Outer Continental Shelf Advisory Boards Section:
"The Governors of coastal States may establish regional
Outer Continental Shelf Advisory boards for such regions and
with such membership as they may determine after consultation
with the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Commerce."
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"If a regional advisory board or a Governor of a potentially
affected coastal State makes specific recommendations to the
Secretary regarding the size, timing, or location of a pro
posed lease sale or on a proposed development and production
plan, the Secretary shall accept such recommendations from
the regional advisory board or Governor, unless he determines
they are not consistent with national security or overriding
national interests. If the Secretary finds that he cannot
accept any such recommendations, he shall communicate, in
writing, to the board or the Governor the reasons for rejection
of such recommendations. The Secretary's determination
pursuant to this subsection shall be final unless determined
in a judicial review to be arbitrary, or capicious. Such
review shall take place in the United States Court of Appeals
for a circuit in which an affected coastal State is located.
The first sentence of this subsection shall not apply to the
determination by the Secretary whether the proposed development
and production plan insures a safe operation."
. Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1975* (S .586); Interstate
Coordination Grants to States Section:
"The States are encouraged to give high priority (1) to coordi
nating State coastal zone planning, policies, and programs in
contiguous interstate areas, and (2) to studying, planning,
and/or implementing unified coastal zone policies in such areas.
The States may conduct such coordination, study, planning, and
implementation through interstate agreement or compacts. The
Secretary (Commerce) is authorized to make annual grants to the
coastal States, not to exceed 90 percent of the cost of such
coordination, study, planning, or implementation, if the
Secretary finds that each coastal State receiving a grant under
this section will use such grants for purposes consistent with
the provisions of sections 305 and 306 of this title."
"The consent of the Congress is hereby given to two or more States
to negotiate and enter into agreements or compacts, not in con
flict with any law or treaty of the United States, for (1) devel
oping and administering coordinated coastal zone planning,
policies, and programs, pursuant to sections 305 and 306 of this
title, and (2) the establishment of such agencies, joint or
otherwise, as the States may deem desirable for making effective
such agreements and compacts. Such agreement or compact shall
be binding and obligatory upon any State or party thereto without
further approval by Congress."
* To amend the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 to authorize and
assist the coastal states to study, plan for, manage, and control
the impact of energy resource development and production which
affects the coastal zone, and for other purposes.
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(Note that the Act recognizes that critical coastal problems are
immediate and provides funds for groups of states wishing to establish
informal interim planning and coordinating entities for their coastal
zones. Interim interstate entities may also receive 90 percent federal
funding, but the provision expires in five years— ample time to
establish formal interstate compacts.)
Coastal Energy Facility Impact Program Section:
"The Secretary (Commerce) is authorized to make a grant to a
coastal State, if he determines that such State's coastal zone
has been, or is likely to be, impacted by the exploration for,
or the development or production of, energy resources or by the
location, construction, expansion, or operation of an energy
facility. Such a grant shall be for the purposes of enabling
such coastal State to study and plan for the economic, environ
mental, and social consequences which are likely to result in
such coastal zone from exploration for and development or pro
duction of such energy resources or from the location, con
struction, expansion, or operation of such an energy facility.
The amount of such a grant may equal up to 100 percent of the
cost of such study and plan to the extent of available funds."
"A coastal State may, for the purpose of carrying out the pro
visions of this section and with the approval of the Secretary,
allocate all or a portion of any grant or loan received under
this section to (1) a local government; (2) an areawide agency
designated under section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development Act of 1966; (3) a regional agency;
or (4) an interstate agency."
(Note a Coastal Energy Facility Impact Fund would be created. $200
million annually for three fiscal years would be allocated to the fund—
$50 million for grants and/or loans for preplanning and $150 million
for impact funding.)
In addition to the above, other legislative and financial support
options could be proposed.

However, the significant point is that a

number of legislative and funding opportunities exist, or are being
proposed, through which the Regional Energy Council's important review
and advisory functions could become a reality.
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KEEPING ON COURSE
New England's and the nation's energy problems will take a long
time to solve.

The difficulty in organizing a national energy policy, in

spite of the 1973 embargo, indicates the massive complexities associ
ated with development of a just and equitable posture that must reflect
widely different values.

For the foreseeable future, there will be

disagreements, experimentation with an expectation of failure from time
to time, and a great deal of activity.

As energy resource problems

intensify, governmental involvement at all levels will increase; a lack
of national direction only complicates the ability of other jurisdictions
to take sensible measures.

Clearly the value differences that must be

integrated argue against the likelihood of a consensus for large-scale
measures that go in a single dominant direction.
As an importer of energy, New England has a position of extreme
vulnerability.

The region is not only vulnerable to supply, it is

presently vulnerable to decisions made in other parts of the nation.
As those decisions must reflect values different than those in New
England, the region stands to suffer because of ex-regional
priorities.
New England, then, is in a precarious position unless or until the
region can better manage its own energy situation.

Clearly the "buy time"

approach through conservation will increase regional energy security,
but such an approach must reflect the desperate regional need to estab
lish long-term economic viability.

An energy policy is not an end
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in itself; it must be a means to other ends because
it so fundamentally affects life styles.

Here in New England energy

policy must drive to economic rehabilitation through development of
secure fuel sources and export markets.

The concept of a creative New

England renewing its economy needs to be implemented once again.
The region's policy must be flexible; experimentation and emerging
new technologies argue against establishment of a rigid energy posture.
It is precisely the emergence of new energy technologies and needs,
however, that contain the elements of a regional energy posture, one
that is built around flexibility and economic revitalization.

In this

regard the entire region can be considered as one unit, for the entire
region must import energy and the entire region is suffering economic
difficulties.
The entire region, then, must develop a necessary mutual thrust
toward the future that emphasizes both energy and economic development.
Regional coordination will allow for more secure development activity
than the individual financially stressed states.

There is no question

that New England's energy actions will carry risk and costs that will
be difficult to bear, but energy decision-making cannot be reduced to
simple^answers that produce guaranteed results.
Throughout this document there have been challenges outlined
that must be undertaken by a regional body.

Although a comprehensive

regional energy entity is difficult to establish at once it is neces
sary to set a common course to achieve the long-term goals of regional
energy development.

Such a regional body would represent each member

state as well as different individual interests.

This council would
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serve the region as an information center and technical advisory board
concerning all energy-related matters; it would aid the region in moving
away from oil dependence while integrating new activities in an economic
development framework.
The essential task of this body will be to establish a framework
of energy policy coherence while taking advantage of the opportunities
of the moment.

The charter of the regional body will be to stress the

long term, but individual activities will be incremental and will encour
age others to take those small steps that over the long run travel large
distances.
The present structure of energy-related planning is extremely
complex, disaggregated, and yet interrelated. Such a regional body would
serve as a central information base regarding OCS development, power
generation, conservation, new energy industry development, and impact
assessment.

An adequate integrated energy information base will serve

to facilitate the decision-making of individual states and state agen
cies while ensuring that the overall goal of economic rehabilitation
is met in a manner to achieve energy security.

It would be through

such a body that meetings are arranged with utilities, OCS developers,
and federal representatives so as to increase communications and an
understanding of the issues involved.
The establishment of yet another institution in addition to
existing institutions carries risks in terms of cost, authority, and
ability to adequately function, but the region's energy posture argues
strongly for a coordinating mechanism among individual states of some
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kind.

If each state within the region agrees that the major energy

issues facing New England are faced in common, and if each state within
the region chooses a complementary development policy, then a regional
body will operate efficiently by expressing the collective views of
each member state.

And whereas national values are widely different and

often competitive, the essential values required in New England are held
in common.
A regional posture that drives toward establishment of an alterna
tive energy infrastructure (including best use of fossil fuels over the
transition period) presents the region with an opportunity to create
an economic position of strength.

The region does not have available

enough resources to compete with traditional energy sectors, and as
these sectors are based on limited resources, their long-term future
is in question.

Given that liquid fossel fuel resources will substan

tially diminish over the next

thirty years, a regional position to

establish an alternative energy infrastructure is critical.

Keeping on

course requires that we move consistently away from oil, toward coal,
some nuclear and ultimately to

renewable energy sources.

The regional

institution has as its primary mandate to keep the direction of
change in

focus, and the timing economic.

It may be an ironic circumstance that presents New England with
an admittedly risky but assured potential.

Whereas for generations

the region has watched local citizens and technologies and industries
disappear to energy-rich areas of the nation, the region now should
focus on its prime resource, the resource the region has always
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produced, that may in the end become most important - Yankee ingenuity.
When energy was plentiful and cheap, the limitations of New England
supply caused economic havoc, for energy was more plentiful and cheaper
elsewhere.

Today, however, it is incumbent to utilize advanced tech

nology in relation to ancient energy sources, because as that cheap
and plentiful energy begins to grow scarce there will remain only untapped
and ancient energy potentials to rescue a society that is committed to
fossil fuels.
New England has that resource as well as the motivation to utilize
that resource in a most productive manner by tying its development
to employment and the efficiency of small independent systems.

And it

is here, based on the energy value of maximum self-sufficiency, that
the New England traditions of home rule and "savvy" come into play,
for their development and expression not only provide a long-term energy
policy, they provide for economic renewal as well.
It is this thrust that the strategies described in the previous
section strive to achieve.

It is only this thrust that accepts ex-

regional limitations and utilizes to maximum benefits those resources
that the region does have.

This is also a general thrust, extremely

long-term while addressing short-term needs, providing the states with
an ability to "zig-zag" their way to a stated goal while allowing for
technological change and minimizing the region's precarious position
with respect to traditional energy supplies.

As outlined in detail, the

region must extend the provision of traditional energy supplies while
embarking on a program to become independent of them, to develop a
regional export base, and to develop a way of life that accepts the
reality of non-renewable resources.
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